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DEATH AND PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE* 
NATALIE M. BANTA** 
Americans store an overwhelming amount of sensitive, personal 
information online. In email accounts, social networking posts, 
blogs, shared pictures, and private documents, individuals store 
(perhaps unwittingly) the secrets and details of their lives in an 
unprecedented manner. During an individual’s life, these 
accounts are seemingly under the direct control of an account 
holder. Privacy is occasionally threatened, but people continue to 
use online services and pour personal information into their 
online accounts. 
When developers created these online services and platforms, it is 
unlikely that they gave much thought to what would happen to 
accounts when an account holder died. Yet, the treatment of these 
accounts after an account holder’s death is an increasingly 
pressing issue in today’s society as more and more Americans die 
with active, password-protected accounts in their name. In 
determining how these assets will be handled at an individual’s 
death, powerful principles collide—including privacy, contract, 
property, and freedom of information. 
This Article discusses how privacy interests are traditionally 
terminated at death and explores how they should be revived and 
reshaped in a digital future. It argues that to align posthumous 
privacy interests with the needs of a digital future, the law must 
ensure that succession principles apply to privacy as well as 
property rights, and that decedents’ individual intent for the fate 
of digital assets is honored. The Article acknowledges that 
private contracts may be a sufficient tool to protect privacy after 
death in some instances, but argues that the lodestar in any 
discussion of posthumous privacy should be testamentary intent. 
In the absence of testamentary intent, state legislatures should 
enact default rules of digital asset succession that accord with the 
family-centered paradigm of inheritance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dying is a legally significant act. Death terminates marriages, 
terminates some contractual obligations, and initiates property 
transfers. A dead person cannot vote, run for office, marry, speak, 
enter contracts, or enforce any rights or privileges. A dead person’s 
wishes respecting her property, however, are honored by succession 
law and American courts to an extraordinary degree. The question 
remains whether a person retains any control over her privacy 
interests after death. 
The right to privacy for the living is one of the most contested 
rights in our nation, and the existence of privacy interests after death 
is still more muddled. The digital age prompts even more questions 
regarding privacy interests. Never has more information about our 
lives been produced and stored. In the past two years, we have 
accumulated more data than all prior human civilization.1 
Furthermore, our capacity to store data is growing at an exponential 
 
 1. Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 
30, http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal [http://perma.cc/4YPD-
5ZHS (staff uploaded archive)] (“The data flow so fast that the total accumulation of the 
past two years—a zettabyte—dwarfs the prior record of human civilization.”). 
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rate.2 We have developed new ways to analyze this immense quantity 
of data by linking databases and improving algorithms.3 
With this dramatic increase of personal data collection, scholars 
have begun to debate what must be done to ensure that this 
staggering quantity of data does not interfere with privacy interests 
during our lives.4 In fact, an entirely new field of law has sprung up to 
address concerns about informational privacy during life.5 Public 
surveys reveal that the majority of Internet users do not believe the 
law offers adequate safeguards to keep their online activity private.6 
Little thought or attention has been given to what happens to our 
privacy interests in our digital assets at death. This is particularly 
concerning because postmortem privacy may be just as important as 
privacy during life. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to control 
the dissemination of information about themselves after death 
accords with the testamentary principles we traditionally value. 
“Digital assets” has a broad definition. For purposes of this 
Article, I use the term to refer to Internet accounts or services that 
 
 2. Id. (claiming that computing power doubles every eighteen months, while storage 
and computational capacity similarly experience “exponential growth”). 
 3. See id. (discussing how algorithms and new ways of linking datasets generate more 
efficiency and create new insights). 
 4. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY 
LAW (2003) (describing the history and development of information privacy law); Clark 
D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321 (2013) (identifying certain harms that result in third-
party disclosures); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1193 (1998) (discussing the commercial exploitation of private information and 
proposing a statute to combat such invasions of privacy); Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and 
Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000) (analyzing the market for 
personal data and various models available to provide a remedy for the invasion of data 
privacy); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control 
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999) (highlighting the vastness of 
private information made public and the failure of consumers to opt out); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010) (encouraging a 
unitary tort for invasion of privacy that reflects the social welfare implications of the 
defendant’s conduct). 
 5. See, e.g., Course Information: Information Privacy Law, VAND. L. SCH., http://law
.vanderbilt.edu/courses/334 [http://perma.cc/AC5A-7L8Y]; Fordham CLIP (Center on 
Law and Information Policy), FORDHAM U. SCH. OF L., http://www.fordham.edu/info
/20686/fordham_clip [http://perma.cc/F8KV-2D6Q]; Information Privacy Law, GEO. U. L. 
CTR., https://epic.org/misc/gulc/ [https://perma.cc/4WK7-7RK7]; Information Privacy Law, 
STAN. L. SCH. (Nov. 6, 2015, 1:17 PM), https://www.law.stanford.edu/courses/information-
privacy-law [https://perma.cc/2GPE-489V]. 
 6. Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/ 
[http://perma.cc/Z5PQ-YGZD] (“86% of internet users have taken steps online to remove 
or mask their digital footprints.	.	.	.	68% of internet users believe current laws are not good 
enough in protecting people’s privacy online	.	.	.	.”). 
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may hold sensitive, personal information at death such as email, social 
networking, pictures, blogs, and document storage sites. Digital 
privacy after death is an area of increasing concern because digital 
accounts store immense amounts of information about our lives—
often, information that is deeply personal and perhaps not meant for 
public consumption at death.7 This information is stored on third-
party servers that an individual user can access through a password-
protected site and is not under the direct and constant control of the 
account holder. When an individual dies, she leaves such password-
protected sites full of personal information. Recognizing this fact, 
state legislatures, courts, and scholars are beginning to consider 
whether such assets are inheritable. So far, eight states have already 
passed legislation giving fiduciaries access to a decedent’s digital 
accounts after death.8 In addition, several states are considering 
similar legislation.9 Meanwhile, many Internet companies are 
challenging such legislation, allegedly concerned that digital asset 
inheritance could negatively affect user privacy concerns.10 With the 
advent and proliferation of digital asset accounts, the scope of privacy 
interests after death needs to be reconsidered.11  
This Article explores how to reshape privacy interests in digital 
assets in a way that is legally and democratically sound. Part I 
explores posthumous privacy interests in general, explaining how 
 
 7. Anecdotally, we all may be able to think of an email in our inboxes right now that 
we would not want to be made public at our deaths. 
 8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. & 
June Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §	5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 194, 
2016); IDAHO CODE §	15-3-715(28) (LEXIS though 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary 
Sess.); IND. CODE §	29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §	143.188 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 58, §	269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS §	33-27-3 
(LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §	64.2-110 (2012 & Supp. 
2015). 
 9. Rachel Emma Silverman, When You Die, Who Can Read Your Email?, WALL ST.	J. 
(Feb. 1, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-you-die-who-can-read-your-
email-1422849600?mod=e2fb [https://perma.cc/WEZ9-5XX2] (listing Florida, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Virginia, and Washington). 
 10. Id. (discussing some Internet firms’ opposition to a Delaware law allowing 
executors to access digital media after the account holder dies). 
 11. Over eighty-five percent of American adults use the Internet in some way. 
Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www
.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Non-internet-users.aspx [https://perma.cc/KP3X-Y5ZU]. 
Almost ninety-five percent of teenagers access the Internet regularly. Internet User 
Demographics, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/teens/internet-user
-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/HE4L-3J6Y]. These numbers demonstrate that the vast 
majority of Americans, young and old, are creating digital assets and leaving a trail of 
personal information online. 
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common law, constitutional and statutory law, and our testamentary 
structures do not attempt to protect a decedent’s privacy interests. 
This Part further explores the theoretical underpinnings that justify 
the law’s approach to posthumous privacy. 
Part II applies the justifications for privacy protections identified 
in Part I to digital assets, arguing that posthumous privacy must be 
reshaped in order to accommodate a future where digital assets 
become even more prevalent. Part II argues that posthumous privacy 
depends on control, and the best way to reshape privacy interests is to 
treat them as a key part of estate planning procedures. The law 
protects decedents’ interests in significant ways, primarily through the 
American succession system, which strives to effect a decedent’s 
desires concerning his property and remains—in fact, his interests 
often override the interests of a living person who may want to do 
something else with the property.12 In light of the advent and 
proliferation of vast quantities of digital assets, Part II argues that 
succession principles should also be used to protect personal secrets 
and privacy interests after death. Part II also explores the use of 
private contracts to protect posthumous privacy and argues that 
private contracts have gone too far in protecting digital asset privacy 
by ignoring individual, testamentary intent. This Part concludes that 
any default rules regarding termination of accounts at death should 
be legislatively determined in a democratic system. 
Part III explores how digital asset accounts should be treated if 
an individual has not made her intent known. Succession principles 
should apply, and living family members should have a claim in 
controlling or accessing a decedent’s digital assets. This Part examines 
legal doctrines that protect or favor family interests after an 
individual has died, namely the doctrines of “familial privacy,” 
publicity, and copyright. Part III concludes by supporting Part II’s 
advocacy for legislation that would establish a default rule allowing a 
decedent’s surviving family members to protect the decedent’s digital 
accounts from being controlled by third parties or publicly 
disseminated. 
The law of privacy and succession must be equipped for our 
impending digital future.13 Ultimately, this Article concludes that 
 
 12. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
1–4 (9th ed. 2013). 
 13. Most Americans already keep vast amounts of private information, 
correspondence, and pictures in digital accounts stored on third-party servers. As 
mentioned earlier, over eighty-five percent of American adults use the Internet in some 
way. Zickuhr, supra note 11. 
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digital asset privacy will best be protected by acknowledging the 
importance of posthumous privacy in a digital age, honoring 
individual choice, and establishing a default rule that accords with a 
family-centered paradigm. 
I.  THE LACK OF POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY 
Privacy is a relatively modern legal construct, born out of 
concerns about technological developments in the nineteenth 
century.14 In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote a 
seminal article voicing concerns about the toll of modern life on 
privacy.15 They pointed to “instantaneous photographs,” “numerous 
mechanical devises,” and the development of the “newspaper 
enterprise” as threats to the “sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life.”16 These advancements in society threatened the “right to be let 
alone,”17 and Warren and Brandeis called on the common law to 
protect the right to privacy and thereby avoid the “evil[s]” of gossip 
and the press.18 Over one hundred years later, the law of privacy is 
still developing as technological advancements continue to erode 
traditional concepts of privacy.19 Digital assets have produced the 
 
 14. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters 
in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1128 (2002) (“It is a historical commonplace 
that ‘privacy’ is a modern invention. Medieval people had no such concept.	.	.	.	Privacy, as 
idea and reality, is the creation of modern bourgeois society. It was above all a creation of 
the nineteenth century.”). 
 15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
 16. Id. at 195. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 196. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that attaching 
a GPS to a suspect’s vehicle and then monitoring the vehicle’s location constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) 
(holding that the warrantless use of heat sensors on a home was a search subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 360 (D. Vt. 2013) 
(holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in real-time cell phone location 
information, which justified police tracking a convicted felon’s cell phone on suspicion of 
drug trafficking and murder); United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1273–74 
(D.N.M. 2013) (holding that scanning a defendant’s magnetic credit and debit card strips 
when the cards were already possessed by law enforcement was not a search subject to 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as the credit and debit card information was “not a 
constitutionally protected area”); DeVittorio v. Hall, 589 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256–57 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a hidden video camera placed in a police locker room was 
not a search because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy), aff’d, 347 F. App’x 
650 (2d Cir. 2009); State v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 868–69 (Vt. 1998) (holding that a 
warrantless video camera activated by a motion sensor and containing video of a suspect 
cultivating marijuana in their own yard was not a search under chapter 1, article 11 of the 
94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016) 
2016] DEATH AND DIGITAL PRIVACY 933 
greatest amount of private individual information the world has ever 
seen,20 and we are still struggling to determine whether and to what 
extent the law should protect the privacy of these accounts—both in 
life and after death. 
Privacy is a loaded term with many different definitions and 
methods of enforcement.21 Protecting privacy after death would 
require courts to enforce the testamentary intent of an individual 
concerning the information stored in her digital accounts after her 
death.22 When concerned with privacy interests after death, the most 
significant consideration is the degree of posthumous control that 
decedents should exert in the name of privacy. Currently, no such 
protections are in place. The common law majority view is that a 
decedent’s estate may not bring an action to protect the decedent’s 
privacy.23 When it comes to an individual’s reputation, constitutional 
privacy interest, or information gleaned from her testamentary estate, 
the law does not honor a decedent’s interest in controlling the 
dissemination of private or false information about herself after her 
death. This Part proceeds by analyzing how common law, 
constitutional and statutory law, and existing testamentary structures 
are inadequate mechanisms to protect posthumous privacy in today’s 
digital age. 
A. Reputational Privacy 
Traditionally, tort law provides one of the main avenues for 
controlling private information and protecting one’s reputation 
during life. The common law has long recognized that privacy 
 
Vermont Constitution, which offers broader protection to privately owned lands outside 
the curtilage of the home than does the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).  
 20. Shaw, supra note 1. 
 21. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: 
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 
458 (1995) (“Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to designate a range of 
wildly disparate interests—from confidentiality of personal information to reproductive 
autonomy—and connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being 
asserted in its name.”). 
 22. See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970); 
Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1810–1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1174 (1992) (“[T]he ability to enforce the privacy of 
any item of information should depend on the intention and conduct of the 
individual	.	.	.	.”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is not 
simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control 
we have over information about ourselves.”).  
 23. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing 
cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (listing cases); infra 
Section I.A. 
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encompasses the ability of an individual to control information about 
himself,24 and tort law attempts to secure that right of privacy by 
punishing those who intrude into another’s life. It does so using a 
variety of causes of action. Although some torts offer minimal privacy 
protection,25 none of these claims can be brought on behalf of a 
decedent’s estate. This Section analyzes how tort law fails to protect 
posthumous privacy. 
1.  Posthumous Privacy Torts 
Although privacy concerns can be traced back to Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article, privacy torts did not gain traction 
until William Prosser categorized the “right to privacy” into four 
distinct torts, thereby creating a workable framework for courts and 
legislatures to implement.26 Prosser suggested the following four 
torts,27 later accepted into the Restatement (Second) of Torts: (1) 
intrusion upon a plaintiff’s solitude or into his private affairs,28 (2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,29 (3) information that 
places a plaintiff in a false light in the public eye,30 and (4) 
appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.31 These torts protect 
an individual’s power to control information about herself and her 
ability to limit others in disclosing information in the public domain.32 
 
 24. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
763 (1989) (“[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass 
the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person. In an organized 
society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus 
the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the 
degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of 
time rendered it private.”). 
 25. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (describing 
four privacy torts). 
 26. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1888 (2010) (noting that Prosser’s division of privacy law into four 
distinct torts made him the “law’s chief architect”). 
 27. Prosser, supra note 25, at 389. 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 29. §	652D. 
 30. §	652E. 
 31. §	652C. 
 32. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989) 
(“[T]he concept of privacy is employed to govern the conduct of other individuals who 
intrude in various ways upon one’s life. Privacy in these contexts can be generally 
understood in its familiar informational sense; it limits the ability of others to gain, 
disseminate, or use information about oneself.”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016) 
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State courts began to recognize tort causes of action for the 
invasion of the right of privacy at the turn of the century.33 Their 
impact on protecting privacy during life is debated, with some 
scholars arguing that torts have been ineffective at remedying 
invasions of privacy.34 No matter their degree of effectiveness, privacy 
torts are generally available to protect privacy during life;35 however, 
the majority of courts do not allow this right to extend beyond 
death.36 
Courts have based their refusal to extend privacy rights beyond 
death on the common law notion that personal rights die with the 
 
 33. See, e.g., Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 137–38 (Ariz. 1945); 
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. 
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905) (“The liberty of privacy exists, has been recognized by the 
law, and is entitled to continual recognition.”); De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148–49 
(Mich. 1881) (recognizing the plaintiff’s right to privacy); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 
1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) 
(recognizing the “gradual extension” of the right to privacy as a means of redressing 
injuries to individual rights).  
 34. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 1125 (“In hindsight, it looks as if the Warren and 
Brandeis idea of privacy	.	.	.	never got much past the starting post; and is now effectively 
dead.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (asserting that “it is generally conceded that [the privacy 
torts conceptualized by Warren and Brandeis] amount[] to little in American practice 
today”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983) (arguing that one common 
law privacy tort did not “become a usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs”). 
 35. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §§	2:1, 3:1, 4:1 (2015); see, e.g., Minnifield v. 
Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 820, 827 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (noting that a tattoo company 
invaded the privacy of a client by submitting a photo of her upper breast in a national 
tattoo magazine without her consent); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 373–74, 379 (Colo. 
1997) (upholding an invasion of privacy tort where an associate disclosed allegedly 
confidential information that another lawyer was homosexual and needed to have a HIV 
test, resulting in his termination); In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 
2008) (holding that a husband’s secret videotaping of his wife in her room constituted an 
invasion of privacy); Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1052–53, 1058–59 (Ohio 2007) 
(recognizing the false light privacy tort when neighbors distributed a handbill seeking a 
reward for information relating to property damage); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 
A.2d 266, 273 (Vt. 1990) (holding that an employer running an advertisement with an 
employee’s name and photograph without the employee’s consent constituted an invasion 
of privacy); cf. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that a 
law enforcement dog sniffing the front porch of an alleged marijuana producer was an 
invasion of privacy interests, therefore leading to suppression of evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 36. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing 
cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“Further, the right 
does not survive but dies with the person.”). There are a few cases where a privacy claim 
has survived death, but these are minority decisions. See, e.g., Real Detective Publ’g Co., 
162 P.2d at 139 (allowing a privacy claim as an “injury to the person” to be brought by a 
decedent’s administratrix under a state statute). 
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person.37 In other words, personal rights (like the right to privacy) 
terminate at the time of death.38 Property rights, however, are 
different; they are not seen as personal rights that die with a 
decedent.39 Rather, a decedent’s estate can enforce property rights on 
the decedent’s behalf.40 Following this reasoning, courts conclude that 
privacy rights protect a personal right specific to the person whose 
privacy was invaded.41 
To explain this conclusion, courts reason that a privacy intrusion 
is an injury to feelings as well as to one’s own peace of mind and 
comfort but does not involve economic damage.42 One court 
explained, “Since, under the law, recovery may be had for an invasion 
of the right of privacy for injured feelings alone, the wrongs redressed 
must be considered as a direct rather than an indirect injury and one 
that is wholly personal in character	.	.	.	.”43 Thus, the feelings and 
mental processes that are protected by the right to privacy make the 
right a personal one, which can only be vindicated through a personal 
cause of action. In other words, the cause of action for an invasion of 
privacy cannot be assigned, inherited, or transferred.44 Other courts 
do not attempt to explain why privacy rights are personal in nature or 
why personal claims cannot be transferred to an estate.45 Instead, 
these courts merely repeat the rule that an estate cannot sue for an 
invasion of privacy on behalf of the decedent.46 
In practice, cases asserting the invasion of a decedent’s privacy 
often arise when news reports or books print information about a 
 
 37. Under the common law, personal rights die with the person, but property rights 
survive and are handled by a decedent’s executor. See Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553 
(1867) (discussing the common law maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona,” that a 
personal action “die[s] with the person” while property rights survive). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass’n, 154 F. 911, 913–14 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907); Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271, 271 
(Ct. Com. Pl. 1894); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	652I cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). 
 42. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 325 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
 43. Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz. 1945). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	652I cmt. a. 
 45. See Nelson v. Gass, 21 Pa. D. 777, 778 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1912) (“Where the action is 
founded merely on an injury to the person, and no property is in question, it dies with the 
person; but where property is concerned, it survives.”). 
 46. See Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala. 1955) (explaining that the 
right to privacy “is a purely personal action and does not survive but dies with the 
person”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	652I cmt. b (“In the absence of 
statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the 
individual whose privacy is invaded.”). 
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decedent that offends surviving family members.47 For example, in 
Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co.,48 a surviving family member sued a 
publisher for stating that her brother, an acclaimed boxing champion, 
had ended up as an impoverished “dope-sodden derelict” and that his 
“knife-scarred body” had been “fished” from the San Francisco Bay.49 
The decedent’s sister argued that this publication was a wrongful 
invasion of the general right of privacy.50 The court dismissed her suit, 
holding that the right of privacy was a personal one that could not be 
asserted by the decedent’s relatives.51 As another example, in 
Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co.,52 a family sued a local publishing 
company after an article in a newspaper accused their father of 
bribing public officials.53 The court again held that a claim of privacy 
only extends to one’s own privacy and does not survive the death of 
the party whose privacy was invaded.54 Courts and commentators 
have made it clear that privacy rights do not survive death.55 In 
limited situations, a family can claim an invasion of their privacy 
interests to keep information about a decedent private, but no 
protection extends to guard the privacy of a decedent herself.56 
2.  Posthumous Defamation 
The law protects an individual’s ability to maintain a good 
reputation through the torts of defamation, libel, and slander, but, 
like the right to privacy, none of these causes of action are available 
 
 47. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 146 (N.D. Tex. 1979) 
(evaluating privacy rights when a news broadcast reported a story that stated murder 
victims were in a homosexual relationship); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 146–47 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (determining whether a book claiming that decedent “was a 
homosexual and a Nazi spy” offended the privacy rights of surviving relatives). 
 48. 325 P.2d 659 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
 49. Id. at 660. 
 50. Id. at 661. 
 51. Id. at 661, 664. 
 52. 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965). 
 53. Id. at 776 (construing New Mexico law). 
 54. Id. at 776–77. 
 55. See Metter v. L.A. Exam’r, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); Bradley v. 
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) (listing cases supporting its 
decision not to extend the right to privacy to a decedent’s surviving relative); 62A AM. 
JUR. 2D Privacy §	13 (2005 & Supp. 2015) (“The right of privacy is a purely personal one, 
and the plaintiff must show an invasion of his or her own right of privacy before recovery 
may be had. The general rule is that even a close relative may not recover for the invasion 
of privacy of another. Thus, an action for invasion of privacy may be brought only by the 
person who was the actual subject of the invasion of privacy, and not by other persons 
such as members of his or her family.”). 
 56. See infra Section III.A for a discussion of family privacy after death.  
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after the rightholder dies.57 There is a direct link between privacy and 
reputation: reputation consists of what people think about an 
individual, and people’s thoughts about a person derive from what 
information they know—or don’t know—about an individual. To 
protect his reputation, an individual must pay careful attention to the 
information available about him. For those who have secrets that 
could destroy their reputation, the ability to control the dissemination 
of that information or otherwise preserve privacy is particularly 
important. 
Defamation and privacy torts are aimed at protecting an 
individual’s reputation. During your life, if someone makes “[a] false 
written or oral statement that damages [your] reputation,” you can 
bring a suit against that person for defamation.58 Once you die, 
however, people can say or write what they want without fear of 
reprisal because defamation of the dead is not a cause of action 
recognized by the common law.59 Although some courts allow 
defamation suits to continue if a living person brought suit and 
subsequently died, courts do not allow an action for defamation to be 
initiated after a person has died.60 
The justifications for not allowing a cause of action for 
defamation after the death of the defamed person are similar to those 
set forth for refusing to extend privacy protections after death. First, 
modern tort law aims “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution 
for harms,”61 and when a person dies, the law finds no harm that can 
be compensated;62 courts reason that a dead person’s reputation can 
 
 57. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 58. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990); Defamation, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 59. Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 79 N.W. 122, 122 (Iowa 1899); Jones v. Matson, 104 
P.2d 591, 595 (Wash. 1940) (“At common law the rule is often stated broadly that causes 
of action for torts die with the person.”). 
 60. Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that there is 
no “basis for recovery in a civil action” for “the malicious defamation of the memory of 
the dead”); Saari v. Gillett Commc’ns of Atlanta, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 736, 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1990) (“[T]hat case merely held that where a living person had brought an action for libel 
and then died while the action was pending, the action did not abate but survived to his 
representative. It clearly does not follow from this holding that a person can be libeled 
after he has died.”). 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	901(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 62. Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So. 2d 790, 791 (La. 1992) (“Once a person is 
dead, there is no extant reputation to injure or for the law to protect. Since the cause of 
action is intended to redress injuries flowing from harm to one’s reputation, we conclude 
that to be actionable defamatory words must be ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff or, 
directly or indirectly, cast a personal reflection on the plaintiff.”). 
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no longer be injured.63 Second, even if a court finds that harm has 
been done to a deceased person’s reputation, the right to protect 
one’s reputation is a personal one and cannot be enforced by a third 
party.64 Thus, the personal nature of the defamation tort is one of the 
main barriers to recognizing a claim for posthumous defamation.65 
Such a claim, even if warranted by blatantly false publications or 
statements made about a decedent, is currently unavailable to protect 
privacy interests after death. Even though the digital age is raising 
questions of posthumous privacy because of the increased amount of 
available personal information, tort law is an inadequate solution and 
offers no protection for posthumous privacy. 
B. Constitutional and Statutory Privacy 
As noted above, the common law does not allow a decedent’s 
estate to bring a tort action to protect the decedent’s privacy. 
Similarly, cognizable solutions to this problem do not currently exist 
in constitutional or statutory law. Neither federal nor state law 
adequately recognizes individual privacy protections after death. 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which seeks to 
deter unreasonable search and seizure,66 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—the substantive tool protecting 
individual conduct and choices67—offer privacy protection in certain 
situations. After death, however, a decedent cannot take advantage of 
the privacy protections embedded in the Fourth and Fourteenth 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Gruschus v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he common 
law did not recognize a right to reflect in the reputation of another and the action did not 
survive the death of the defamed party.”); Lee v. Weston, 402 N.E.2d 23, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1980) (“Defamatory words are not actionable unless they refer to some ascertained or 
ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.”); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 
160 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1941). 
 65. See Gruschus, 342 F.2d at 776. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated	.	.	.	.”). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §	1. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
wholly outlawing contraceptives or abortion. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–
86 (1965) (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in 
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, 
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that 
relationship.	.	.	.	We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (“This right of privacy	.	.	.	is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
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Amendments. A decedent is not a “person” within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore cannot take advantage of any 
privacy protection that the Fourteenth Amendment gives a living 
person.68 Recently, an executor filed a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. §	1983, claiming that a medical examiner’s determination that 
the decedent took her own life was a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the determination of suicide deprived the 
decedent of due process of law.69 The court dismissed the claim, 
finding that it was “well settled that a deceased person has no 
constitutional rights.”70  
Similarly, it follows that the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
from unreasonable search and seizure is a privacy interest that cannot 
be enforced after death. For example, in Hubenschmidt v. Shears,71 
plaintiffs in a wrongful death action challenged evidence that was 
removed from the bodies of the deceased (blood alcohol tests) as a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.72 The court found the results 
could be properly admitted because the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy ended with the death of the person and could not be claimed 
by the deceased’s estate.73 
Statutory law, like constitutional law, also fails to recognize 
personal privacy rights of the dead. Federal courts have found that 
when a statute uses the term “person,” it refers to “a living human 
being” and does not provide a basis for a posthumous claim for 
violation of the statute or right at issue.74 Federal law such as the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and numerous state law 
counterparts concerning public records contain privacy protections.75 
 
 68. Swickard v. Wayne Cty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Mich. 1991) (holding 
that the privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment is personal and cannot be 
asserted by a decedent’s estate). 
 69. Infante v. Dignan, 782 F. Supp. 2d 32, 32, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 70. Id. at 38. 
 71. 270 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1978). 
 72. Id. at 3–4. 
 73. Id. at 4; see also McLean v. Rogers, 300 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) 
(“Issues such as search and seizure, [or the] right to privacy	.	.	.	which could be raised in 
cases dealing with extraction of a blood sample from a living person do not apply.”). 
 74. See Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a deceased 
person could not bring an action under the Civil Rights Act); see also Whitehurst v. 
Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[A decedent] is no longer a person within our 
constitutional and statutory framework, and has no rights of which he may be deprived.”). 
 75. The Freedom of Information Act exempts “personnel and medical files” from 
disclosure if the disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.” 5 U.S.C. §	552(b)(6) (2012). Similarly, §	552(b)(7)(C) exempts disclosure of 
investigative records complied for law enforcement purposes that constitute “an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” §	552(b)(7)(C); see also Daniel J. Solove, 
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FOIA protects the ability of “any person” to request records 
maintained by an executive agency.76 The law also prevents 
government records from being released to the public if those records 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy.”77 
Because FOIA acknowledges the importance of privacy interests 
through these exceptions, it provides only partial protection. Courts 
look only to common law privacy protections to determine whether a 
FOIA request should be denied under a privacy exception, and thus 
FOIA generally does not protect posthumous privacy interests.78 In 
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish,79 a man was 
found dead in a park near Washington, D.C.80 During the 
investigation of the death, police officers took ten pictures of his 
body, to which journalists later requested access under FOIA.81 In 
construing FOIA’s privacy exemption, the Supreme Court looked to 
the common law concerning privacy at death.82 Rather than finding 
that the decedent had a privacy interest in the crime scene photos, the 
Court held that the decedent’s family members were the individuals 
whose privacy interests in the death scene images were protected by 
FOIA.83 Therefore, the Court denied the FOIA request for these 
pictures, holding that revealing this information would be an 
unwarranted invasion of the family’s personal privacy.84 However, the 
Court’s analysis demonstrated that because FOIA protections look to 
common law privacy protections, an individual’s personal privacy 
interests are not protected under FOIA after his death.85 
 
Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1137, 1160–64 (2002) (discussing federal and state freedom of information laws and their 
exemptions relating to privacy).  
 76. §	552(a)(3)(A). 
 77. §	552(b)(7)(C). 
 78. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) 
(explaining that Congress intended for FOIA to protect “against public intrusions long 
deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions”); Ray 
Madoff, Dead Right: In America, the Living Aren’t Always in Charge, 21 EXPERIENCE, no. 
1, 2011, at 6, 11 (“Although these cases may seem to extend privacy protections to family 
members	.	.	.	they only limit access to information held by a government.”). 
 79. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 80. Id. at 160–61. 
 81. Id. at 161. 
 82. Id. at 168. 
 83. Id. at 167–68. 
 84. Id. at 171, 175. 
 85. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (explaining that at common law, 
privacy rights were personal rights that were nontransferable and therefore terminated at 
death); cf. Favish, 541 U.S. at 169–70 (acknowledging that Congress enacted FOIA in 
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Federal law also protects the use and dissemination of personally 
identifiable information maintained by federal agencies under the 
Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”).86 The Privacy Act prohibits 
disclosure of identifying information unless the disclosure falls under 
a statutory exception.87 Although a decedent’s death is not a statutory 
exception allowing the release of information, in 1975 the Office of 
Management and Budget published guidelines stating that the Privacy 
Act did not contemplate permitting relatives to protect the privacy of 
deceased individuals.88 These guidelines are treated deferentially by 
federal courts.89 Most recently, the Second Circuit noted that a party 
“correctly asserts that deceased individuals generally do not enjoy 
rights under the Privacy Act.”90 
Another federal law may play a more significant role in privacy 
after death, especially as it relates to digital assets. In 1986, Congress 
passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) as part of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.91 The SCA governs and 
protects the privacy of online communications.92 The SCA 
criminalizes “intentional[] access[] without authorization [of] a facility 
through which an electronic communication service is provided.”93 It 
prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic communication 
service to the public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or 
entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by 
 
consideration of the common law but suggesting that the privacy interest protected under 
FOIA extends further).  
 86. 5 U.S.C. §	552a (2014). Section 552a is referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974. See 
Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,949 (July 9, 1975). 
 87. 5 U.S.C. §	552a(k). 
 88. Id.; Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,951 (July 9, 1975) (“The 
[Privacy] Act did not contemplate permitting relatives and other interested parties to 
exercise rights granted by the Privacy Act to individuals after the demise of those 
individuals.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 919 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Crumpton v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D.D.C. 1994) (“The releases 
complained of are not covered by the Privacy Act because [the individual] is 
deceased	.	.	.	.”). 
 90. Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 91. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§	2701–2712 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-
114, approved Dec. 28, 2015)); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 & n.1 
(2004).  
 92. Kerr, supra note 91, at 1208 (“The SCA	.	.	.	by and large	.	.	.	reflects a sound 
approach to the protection of stored Internet communications.”). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. §	2701(a)(1) (2014). Fines and imprisonment of up to ten years are 
imposed upon those who violate §	2701(a). See §	2701(b). 
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that service[,]”94 unless the recipient of the information is an agent95 
or the disclosure is made with the customer’s consent.96 Further, the 
government may not obtain information from an Internet company 
without a warrant or a subpoena.97 If a company violates the SCA, it 
could be liable for statutory and punitive damages and attorney’s 
fees.98 The SCA has no provision on how information should be 
treated after an account holder’s death or whether an estate could 
bring a claim under the Act if a company divulged the electronic 
communications of a decedent. 
The general lack of posthumous privacy protection reflected in 
FOIA, the Privacy Act, and SCA extends beyond federal law. Some 
states create privacy protections in their constitutions, but these 
constitutional provisions remain silent on privacy protections after 
death.99 Questions about privacy after death under state law most 
often arise when the public wants access to autopsy or crime scene 
photographs, video recordings, or other records that show or describe 
a deceased individual.100 As with the Supreme Court in Favish, state 
courts often hold that disseminating autopsy photos violates the 
 
 94. 18 U.S.C.A. §	2702(a)(1). 
 95. §	2702(b)(1). 
 96. §	2702(c)(2). 
 97. §§	2702(a)(3), 2702(b)(2), 2703(a), 2703(c)(2). 
 98. 18 U.S.C. §	2707(c). 
 99. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, §	22 (LEXIS through 2015 First Reg. Sess. and 
First and Second Spec. Sess.) (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall 
not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §	8 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. 
Sess.) (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, §	23 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 4, 2014) (“Every 
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the 
person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, §	10 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the 
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling 
state interest.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 685–86, 694–95 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that plaintiff family members stated a claim for outrageous 
infliction of emotional distress by reckless conduct when police officers publically 
disclosed photos and video of an autopsy which were part of a criminal investigation); 
Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (holding that family members have a 
common law right to privacy in the photographs and autopsy reports of deceased loved 
ones); Comaroto v. Pierce Cty. Med. Exam’r’s Office, 43 P.3d 539, 542–44 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002) (denying a convicted child molester access to his victim's suicide note, which was 
part of the medical examiner’s report, under state public records law); Clay Calvert, A 
Familial Privacy Right over Death Images: Critiquing the Internet-Propelled Emergence of 
a Nascent Constitutional Right that Preserves Happy Memories and Emotions, 40 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 475, 500 & n.162 (2013) (describing how Hustler Magazine’s 
request for a set of gruesome crime scene photographs spurred change in Georgia’s public 
records law). 
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surviving family members’ privacy.101 A few states have even passed 
legislation to prevent public disclosure of certain death images.102 
Although some states provide limited posthumous privacy 
protections, examples are sparse; states, in general, have not adopted 
comprehensive statutory privacy protections for decedents. 
C. Testamentary Privacy 
There is also a lack of privacy protection for decedents’ 
testamentary documents. The law of wills and intestate succession 
ensure that a decedent’s property is distributed according to her 
intent after death, but neither wills nor intestacy statutes protect a 
decedent’s personal, posthumous privacy interests. 
Because probate proceedings are public proceedings, decedents 
lose privacy as to the contents and distribution of their estate when 
the estate probates a will.103 The contents of a will, documents, or 
information that arise during a probate proceeding are public records 
open to public inspection.104 Journalists, curious neighbors, or 
estranged family members are welcome to examine a decedent’s 
will.105 Newspaper articles, books, and websites track the wills of 
 
 101. For more discussion of family members’ privacy as related to decedents’ digital 
assets, see infra Section III.A. 
 102. FLA. STAT. §	406.135 (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 First Reg. & Spec. A 
Sess.) (exempting autopsy records from public disclosure); GA. CODE ANN. §	45-16-
27(e)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2015) (preventing autopsy photos from being disclosed if not 
under a listed exception); LA. STAT. ANN. §	44:19(B) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (“[P]hotographs, video, or other visual images, in whatever form, of or relating to an 
autopsy conducted under the authority of the office of the coroner shall be confidential, 
are deemed not to be public records, and shall not be released	.	.	.	except as otherwise 
provided in this Section.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §	130A-389.1(a) (2013 & Supp. 2015) 
(“Except as otherwise provided by this section, no custodian of the original recorded 
images shall furnish copies of photographs or video or audio recordings of an autopsy to 
the public.”). 
 103. See In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
 104. Id. at 823 (“[T]here can be no doubt that court records are public records, 
available to the public in general, including news reporters, unless a specific exception 
makes specific records non-public.	.	.	.	[N]o statute exempts probate files from the status of 
public records[.]” (citations omitted)). 
 105. Id.; Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 166 N.W.2d 546, 547, 549 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1963) (upholding the right of a newspaper corporation to view the will of a 
prominent, recently deceased member of the community); GEORGE M. TURNER, 2 
REVOCABLE TRUSTS §	64:7.4 (5th ed. 2014) (“By definition, the probate system is 
intended to be a public vehicle. The spectacles of people’s lives, finances, and family 
relationships as well as nonfamily relationships, are so notorious that they need not be 
reviewed.”). A current TV show, The Will: Family Secrets Revealed, is devoted to 
uncovering family secrets after death. See The Will: Family Secrets Revealed Gets a 
Facelift for Season Three, Featuring Celebrity Stories and Famous Family Feuds, 
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celebrities or interesting individuals to give the public more 
information about their lives from the property they left at their 
passing.106 For example, in In re Estate of Hearst,107 family members 
requested that the court seal probate proceedings, claiming that the 
proceedings revealed information about their identities and property 
that could be used against them by terrorist groups.108 The appellate 
court remanded the case to a lower court to determine the risk to the 
family, emphasizing that “when individuals employ the public powers 
of state courts [such as probate] to accomplish private ends,	.	.	.	they 
do so in full knowledge of the possibly disadvantageous circumstance 
that the documents and records filed in the trust will be open to 
public inspection.”109 
Because documents filed in a probate proceeding are public, 
decedents lose privacy as to the contents of their estate, which could 
include the amount of money in accounts, the net value of an estate, 
or the specific personal property owned by a decedent. For instance, 
when Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis died, her will revealed that her 
estate was worth less than widely expected.110 In addition, her will 
revealed a detailed list of her personal property, including such items 
as a “Greek alabaster head of a woman[,]” Indian miniatures, a copy 
of her first husband’s inaugural address signed by Robert Frost, 
furniture, jewelry, and clothes.111 
 
DISCOVERY: PRESS WEB, https://press.discovery.com/us/id/press-releases/2012/will-family-
secrets-revealed-gets-facelift-se-2056/ [http://perma.cc/W82T-M646]. 
 106. See generally RUSSELL J. FISHKIND, PROBATE WARS OF THE RICH AND 
FAMOUS: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING AND PROBATE LITIGATION 
(2011) (tracking the estate litigation contests of several celebrities); ANDREW W. 
MAYORAS & DANIELLE B. MAYORAS, TRIAL AND HEIRS: FAMOUS FORTUNE FIGHTS! 
(2009) (describing stories of inheritance contests of public figures); HERBERT E. NASS, 
WILLS OF THE RICH AND FAMOUS (2000) (providing descriptions and excerpts from wills 
of public figures); Family Feud Erupts over Heath Ledger’s Will After Daughter Matilda Is 
Left Out, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 10, 2008, 3:59 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz
/article-529408/Family-feud-erupts-Heath-Ledgers-daughter-Matilda-left-out.html 
[http://perma.cc/4NMJ-QH8F] (revealing details of actor’s will); Famous Wills and Trusts, 
TRUETRUST.COM, http://www.truetrust.com/Famous_Wills_and_Trusts/Famous_Wills
_and_Trusts.html [https://perma.cc/373X-NDUE] (providing copies of several last wills of 
public figures). 
 107. 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
 108. Id. at 825. 
 109. Id. at 825–26. 
 110. David Cay Johnston, Mrs. Onassis’s Estate Worth Less than Estimated, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 21, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/21/nyregion/mrs-onassis-s-estate 
-worth-less-than-estimated.html [http://perma.cc/8P62-AWUD]. 
 111. Steve Fainaru, Onassis Gave Bulk of Estate to Children, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 31, 
2003), http://www.boston.com/news/packages/jfkjr/jackie_will.htm [http://perma.cc/F4UX-
JLMG]. 
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In addition to losing privacy as to the content of the estate, when 
a will is filed, a decedent also loses the ability to keep private the 
identities of the will’s beneficiaries. In Onassis’s example, her will 
revealed various gifts to her longtime friends and confidantes, her 
maids, her children’s governess, her accountant, her butler, and her 
lawyer.112 Furthermore, bequests and devises in a will can reveal 
secret relationships. In the case of In re Estate of Kuralt,113 Charles 
Kuralt’s holographic will revealed that he had continued a thirty-year 
extra-marital affair with a woman named Patricia Elizabeth 
Shannon.114 He kept this relationship secret from his wife and from 
the public throughout his life.115 When his wife attempted to probate 
his property in Montana, she learned that Kuralt had attempted to 
give the property to Shannon in a 1989 holographic will and again in a 
1997 letter.116 This testamentary devise revealed to the Kuralt family 
and the public the extent of Kuralt’s private relationships with 
Shannon and her children.117 This demonstrates how a decedent may 
not realize the extent of personal information that is conveyed to the 
public when her will is probated. 
There is, however, a tool to protect one’s privacy as to the 
contents of her estate and to whom the estate is distributed—an inter 
vivos revocable trust.118 Although revocable trusts and wills serve 
almost identical purposes, a trust is accorded privacy after death while 
a probated will becomes a matter of public record.119 A trust is a 
nonprobate asset, which means that a trustee distributes property 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. In re Estate of Kuralt (Kuralt II), 2000 MT 359, 15 P.3d 931; In re Estate of Kuralt 
(Kuralt I), 1999 MT 111, 981 P.2d 771. 
 114. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶	6, 15 P.3d at 932; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶	2, 981 P.2d at 771. 
 115. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶	5, 15 P.3d at 932; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶	9, 981 P.2d at 773. 
Charles Kuralt was a public figure as host and journalist of a CBS show called “On the 
Road.” Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶	9, 981 P.2d at 772. 
 116. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶¶	8, 11, 15 P.3d at 932–33; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶¶	14, 17, 
981 P.2d at 773–74. 
 117. See Bob Anez, Charles Kuralt’s Secret Life, SALON (June 8, 1999, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/1999/06/08/kuralt/ [http://perma.cc/UX47-FEGM] (describing the 
relationship Kuralt had with Shannon and her children). 
 118. See TURNER, supra note 105, §	64:7.4 (“[T]he vast majority of Revocable Living 
Trusts go through no scrutiny by any individual or organization which would invade the 
privacy of the estate or the beneficiaries.”); see also In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 
821, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that family members “can eschew court-regulated 
devices for transmission of inherited wealth and rely on private arrangements such as inter 
vivos gifts, joint tenancies, and so-called ‘living’ or grantor trusts”). 
 119. See Francis H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 566 (2008) 
(discussing the strength of “trust privacy”); supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text 
(describing how a probated will is generally available for public viewing). 
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according to the terms of the trust without court supervision.120 
Because a trust instrument is not part of a public record, individuals 
who use a trust to distribute their property are entitled to privacy—
the public cannot obtain information concerning the amount of 
money held in the estate, the method of distribution, or the recipients 
of the funds.121 When Bing Crosby died, for example, the public was 
unable to obtain information about his estate because Crosby had 
placed it in a revocable trust.122 Similarly, Marlon Brando used a trust 
to keep his distribution scheme private.123 Privacy is one of the most 
compelling reasons to have a revocable trust instead of a will.124 
A trust’s privacy, however, is not absolute. If a beneficiary 
challenges the trust or brings suit against the trustee, a trust 
instrument may become part of a public record.125 Some states even 
require a trust instrument to be recorded or otherwise available.126 
Third parties may require copies of a trust instrument as a 
precondition to investing or dealing with trust assets.127 In general, 
however, “[t]he vast majority of Revocable Living Trusts go through 
no scrutiny by any individual or organization which would invade the 
privacy of the estate or the beneficiaries.”128 Thus, succession law 
does provide a method to protect the privacy of a decedent’s estate 
through the use of a revocable trust. But if a trust is not created, 
intestacy or will proceedings become a matter of public record. 
The terms of a will may reveal private information, but the 
personal property distributed under the terms of a will or intestacy 
statutes may reveal even more private information about a decedent. 
Once an estate asserts control over a decedent’s belongings, the estate 
owns any information revealed through the content of those 
 
 120. See TURNER, supra note 105, §	64:7.4; DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 
42.  
 121. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §	1013 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (stating that trust 
certification “is designed to protect the privacy of a trust instrument by discouraging 
requests from persons other than beneficiaries for complete copies of the instrument” and 
that privacy is compromised if the trust instrument must be disclosed to the public). 
 122. Foster, supra note 119, at 558 n.17. 
 123. Id. at 563–64. 
 124. Id. at 565–66 (“[M]any see privacy as an essential feature of the revocable trust, 
one that the legal system has gone to extraordinary efforts to preserve.”). 
 125. Id. at 564. 
 126. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §	30-4-4-4(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. 
Sess.) (permitting an individual to petition the court for information concerning 
beneficiaries of a trust with a showing of reasonable need). 
 127. JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 555 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that “the trustee may have to 
provide copies of the trust document to financial institutions that invest trust assets”). 
 128. TURNER, supra note 105, §	64:7.4. 
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belongings.129 A decedent’s documents, diaries, letters, and secrets are 
left behind for survivors to find and disseminate if they choose. 
Accordingly, our system of succession does not protect privacy from 
family members at death, because property dissemination usually 
reveals an individual’s secrets, with a narrow exception offered to 
those who create inter vivos revocable trusts. Our system of 
succession, however, allows an individual to choose who gets what 
information from the devised property. Individual intent is always the 
paramount concern in distributing a decedent’s property. 
*	*	* 
As we have seen, the common law does not recognize personal 
privacy interests after death in the form of a privacy tort (i.e., 
intrusion upon solitude, public disclosure of private facts, or false 
light) or defamation.130 Rather, courts hold that privacy is a personal 
interest that dies with a decedent.131 Similarly, constitutional privacy 
rights do not persist after death.132 In addition, federal statutory law 
relies on common law principles and generally does not protect 
posthumous privacy.133 Lastly, our testamentary structure does not 
protect personal privacy, as wills and intestacy actions are public 
record.134 Under these principles, a decedent has no personal privacy 
interests in his digital assets. Internet companies may assert their 
users’ privacy concerns by prohibiting inheritance, but there is 
currently no sound legal basis to protect personal privacy at death.135 
Yet, with the proliferation of digital assets and the immense amount 
 
 129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS §	1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
 130. See supra Section I.A. 
 131. Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing cases); 
Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (listing cases). 
 132. See supra Section I.B; see also Swickard v. Wayne Cty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 
304, 312 (Mich. 1991) (finding that the privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
personal and cannot be asserted by a decedent’s estate). 
 133. An argument can be made that the SCA protects posthumous privacy because it 
does not specifically mention death and prohibits Internet companies from disclosing the 
contents of an account without consent. See 18 U.S.C.A. §	2702(a)(3), (b)(3) (West, 
Westlaw through P.L. 114-114, approved Dec. 28, 2015). Although Internet companies 
have argued that they are prevented from disclosing digital assets after an account holder’s 
death, the SCA has not been used to prosecute disclosure of digital assets to an estate 
after death. See Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in 
Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 841 n.260 
(2014). 
 134. See supra notes 103–06; supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Banta, supra note 133, at 816–18, 837–38. 
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of information stored in these accounts, we should reconsider 
posthumous privacy interests in a digital world. 
II.  PERSONAL DIGITAL ASSET PRIVACY AFTER DEATH 
Digital assets raise new concerns and questions about privacy 
after death that the common law has, so far, failed to address. The 
fate of email and social networking accounts is especially important to 
consider, as these digital accounts contain more personal 
information—such as writings, thoughts, and pictures—than ever 
before. There are at least three ways digital accounts could be treated 
after death. First, these accounts could be deleted at the account 
holder’s death to preserve individual privacy. Such deletion could 
occur at the request of the decedent’s executor or under the terms of 
the service agreement between a deceased account holder and an 
Internet company.136 Second, the family of a decedent could claim 
ownership of the digital “property” held in these accounts and 
demand access to the accounts under the principles of succession 
law.137 Third, if accounts are not deleted, there may be a point when 
they are released to the public in the service of history—long after the 
account holders have died.138 Each scenario poses significant risks to 
posthumous privacy, testamentary intent, and historical preservation. 
Of these three treatments, the only ways to truly protect personal 
digital asset privacy after death are through our succession law, 
additional public legislation, or the terms of a private contract. This 
Part analyzes the ways personal digital asset privacy can be ensured 
after death and argues that succession principles should be followed 
to empower individual account holders to make testamentary privacy 
decisions about the posthumous treatment of their digital accounts. 
Private contracts with blanket provisions about account termination 
at death are inadequate; instead, default rules about termination of 
digital asset accounts after death should be legislatively determined. 
 
 136. See, e.g., Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo
/utos/en-us/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2012) [http://perma.cc/TKK5-R3VF] (“No Right of 
Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree that your Yahoo account is non-
transferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate 
upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account may be 
terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.” (emphasis added)). 
 137. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606, 609 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). 
 138. Think for a moment what it would be like to have access to the email account of 
John F. Kennedy, soldiers fighting in World War I and World War II, or Elvis Presley. 
Americans are creating an unparalleled historical treasure trove through their creation of 
digital assets and regular Internet use. 
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A. Honoring Testamentary Intent 
Succession law aims to protect a decedent’s testamentary intent, 
so long as that intent does not violate public policy.139 If a decedent 
makes it clear that she would like her digital assets destroyed, the law 
of wills requires courts and beneficiaries to honor her clear intent. If a 
decedent does not make her intent known, intestacy laws require that 
assets descend to the decedent’s survivors.140 The law honors 
testamentary intent by (1) allowing an individual to determine how 
her body (something that is not a property interest) is treated after 
death and (2) requiring executors to fulfill fiduciary duties 
implementing a will. Both examples show that traditional succession 
law protects a decedent’s privacy interests and could be used to 
ensure that a decedent’s wishes regarding her digital assets are 
honored. 
1.  Human Dignity and Decency Support Posthumous Privacy 
The principles of modern succession law are geared towards 
maintaining human dignity, a goal that would be furthered by 
honoring an individual’s last wishes about his privacy. For example, 
modern succession law protects a decedent’s privacy in a limited way 
by honoring a decedent’s wishes about his bodily remains.141 Yet this 
was not always the case. Under the English common law, neither a 
decedent nor his estate had a property right in his corpse, and, 
therefore, a decedent had no power to direct the disposition of his 
remains by testamentary instrument.142 Instead, burial was in the 
exclusive power and jurisdiction of the church.143 In America, 
however, beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
testators began to claim the right to control the manner in which their 
bodies were buried.144 This practice derived from Roman law, which 
gave an individual power to direct his burial.145 Eventually, the 
 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS §	10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 140. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§	2-101 to -103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 141. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 507–08. 
 142. See In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (Sur. Ct. 1938); In re Riegle’s Estate, 
32 N.Y.S. 168, 171 (Sur. Ct. 1894); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904). 
 143. In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 84. 
 144. Id.; see also Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1895) (“[T]he duty of 
courts [is] to see to it that the expressed wish of one, as to his final resting place, shall, so 
far as it is possible, be carried out.”).  
 145. In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 89. (“Thus we find in the Roman law express 
recognition of the right of a deceased by testament to direct his burial and to nominate the 
person to take charge of it. The testament of this deceased, therefore, follows a pattern of 
the ancient Roman law.”); John H. Corwin, Burial Law, 39 ALB. L.J. 196, 197 (1889) 
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majority of courts held that a testator could direct how his body 
should be disposed of via testamentary instrument.146 
Courts will enforce a decedent’s wishes regarding the treatment 
of her remains even over objections from her family.147 For example, 
where a decedent had stated his desire for his body to be cremated, 
but his next of kin opposed the cremation, the court found that the 
testamentary wishes of the decedent were “paramount to all other 
considerations” and, thus, enforced the cremation.148 A more recent 
example occurred in Iowa, where a decedent made it known to a 
company that he wished the company to cryopreserve his head.149 The 
decedent’s family disregarded his wishes and buried his remains.150 
The court ordered disinterment of the decedent’s body according to 
his testamentary instructions.151 Similarly, testamentary intent for an 
individual’s reproductive material is also enforced under the law. In 
Speranza v. Repro Lab Inc.,152 a decedent’s parents sought to use the 
decedent’s stored sperm to impregnate a surrogate mother.153 The 
decedent, however, had given instructions to the sperm bank that he 
wished his sperm to be destroyed at his death.154 Ultimately, the court 
 
(“The ancient Greeks and Romans were particular to carry out the directions of the 
deceased respecting the disposition of his body.	.	.	.	The law of New York more than 
follows these unwritten and ancient customs and the law of Solon	.	.	.	.”). 
 146. In re Henderson’s Estate, 57 P.2d 212, 215 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (collecting 
cases); In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (quoting GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THE 
LAW OF WILLS 640 (2d ed. 1936) (“[T]he weight of authority in this country holds that a 
testator has a right to direct the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after death, 
and his directions in this respect generally have been given effect.”)); Wood v. E. R. 
Butterworth & Sons, 118 P. 212, 214 (Wash. 1911) (“[T]he wishes of the deceased person, 
if ascertained, should be given controlling force	.	.	.	.”). There are also actions at law that 
protect a corpse from being disturbed or mutilated. See Palmquist v. Standard Accident 
Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358, 360 (S.D. Cal. 1933) (mutilation); Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. 
Co. v. Baughn, 148 So. 154, 156 (Ala. 1933) (improper preparation for burial); Bessemer 
Land & Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 18 So. 565, 565 (Ala. 1895) (disturbance of burial 
site). 
 147. Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Mem’l Chapel, 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967–68 (Sup. 
Ct. 1993). 
 148. Id.; see also Kasmer v. Limner, 697 So. 2d 220, 220–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
(upholding testator’s desire to cremate his body in the face of his family’s objections based 
on “reasons of conscience”). 
 149. Alcor Life Extension Found. v. Richardson, 785 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2010). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 732. 
 152. 875 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 153. Id. at 451. 
 154. Id. 
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enforced the decedent’s testamentary intent and refused to allow his 
parents to obtain their son’s sperm.155 
Interestingly, modern courts allow a decedent to exercise power 
over her corpse without dislodging the common law notion that there 
is no property interest in a corpse.156 This is especially striking given 
that the right to devise, which allows decedents to pass their property 
on to beneficiaries, is a property interest. The justification for such 
freedom of disposition is based on the recognition that an individual’s 
property interest in a thing allows an individual to control the 
distribution of that thing after death.157 Because a decedent has no 
property interest in her corpse, this justification cannot be the basis 
for protecting her right to dispose of her corpse according to her own 
intent and gives rise to several implications. One implication of failing 
to recognize a property right in a corpse is that courts retain power to 
limit testamentary control over bodily remains and ensure that 
dispositions are “done within the limits of reason and decency as 
related to the accepted customs of mankind.”158 Another implication 
is that courts must recognize some other kind of interest to justify 
allowing a decedent’s desires to control her bodily remains. As one 
court put it, “the burial of the dead is a subject which interests the 
feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of 
actual property.”159 
It seems as though the courts imply that a personal interest in 
disposing of one’s own property mirrors a person’s privacy interests 
after death—not quite property but nonetheless invoking the 
protections of property. Some sort of “quasi-property” interest allows 
 
 155. Id. at 454. 
 156. In re Henderson’s Estate, 57 P.2d 212, 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (finding 
elements of a proprietary interest, but not a full property interest, in a dead body); In re 
Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 87–88 (Sur. Ct. 1938) (“In New York it has been stated 
that there is no property in a corpse.	.	.	.	[N]o action can be maintained by the 
executor	.	.	.	upon the theory of any property right	.	.	.	in a decedent’s body	.	.	.	.” 
(quotations omitted)). 
 157. See In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (“[A] person has some 
interest in his body, and the organs thereof, of such a nature that he should be able to 
make a disposition thereof	.	.	.	.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 1–2 
(introducing freedom of disposition). 
 158. In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d at 110. Testamentary control over bodily remains 
“should [not] be regarded as an absolute property right by which a person could give 
absurd or preposterous directions that would require extravagant waste of useful property 
or resources, or be offensive to the normal sensibilities of society in respect for the dead.” 
Id. 
 159. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237–38 (1872). 
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courts to enforce a testator’s wishes concerning his body.160 When 
courts honor the wishes of an individual with respect to his bodily 
remains, courts do not protect a property interest per se, but rather 
the individual’s personal interest in maintaining his dignity even after 
death.161 In this way, an individual’s interest in controlling his bodily 
remains is akin to a privacy interest. Although protecting the privacy 
of digital assets is not the same as honoring an individual’s last wishes 
regarding burial, the principle that succession law protects interests 
beyond property rights (disposition of a corpse) after an individual’s 
death can be extended to the proposition that an individual’s wishes 
regarding privacy of digital assets should be given greater weight, 
whether or not the digital assets are seen as a property interest. 
2.  Fiduciary Duties Support Posthumous Privacy 
The second way traditional succession law can protect 
posthumous privacy is through the fiduciary duties it imposes on 
executors to carry out a decedent’s intent. If the law were to treat 
digital assets like tangible assets, accounts would be released to a 
decedent’s estate. It would then be incumbent upon executors and 
beneficiaries to protect the decedent’s privacy interests. Although a 
decedent has no enforceable claim to protect a privacy interest after 
death, succession law enforces a decedent’s testamentary intent. If a 
decedent has made her intention for the posthumous treatment of her 
digital assets known, families and courts must honor those wishes as a 
matter of succession law. 
Courts go to great lengths to protect the control a decedent has 
over his property,162 enforcing a decedent’s testamentary intent for 
 
 160. See, e.g., Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), 
superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 27, 1934, ch. 66, 1934 Tex. Gen. Laws 146, 157–58.  
 161. Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1895) (“In one view, it is true it may 
not matter much where we rest after we are dead; and yet there has always existed, in 
every person, a feeling that leads him to wish that after his death his body shall repose 
beside those he loved in life. Call it sentiment, yet it is a sentiment and belief which the 
living should know will be respected after they are gone.”); Burnett, 67 S.W.2d at 1041 
(“Public policy and due regard for the public health, as well as the universal sense of 
propriety, require that dead bodies of human beings be decently cared for and disposed of 
at the very earliest moment	.	.	.	.”).  
 162. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, No. 1-948 / 11-0940, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 
116, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. February 15, 2012) (holding that proceeds of life insurance 
should go to second wife per a premarital agreement, against wishes of the executor); 
Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E.2d 101, 117 (Mass. Ct. App. 2009) (denying widow’s 
attempts to invalidate decedent’s prenuptial agreement); Malek v. Patten, 678 P.2d 201, 
206 (Mont. 1984) (holding that certificates of deposit and assets within a checking account 
were meant to be a gift by decedent, despite the fact that the cotenant did not sign nor 
have a key to the safety deposit box where the certificates were held). 
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the distribution of his tangible and intangible goods even if such 
distribution appears unfair, bizarre, or distasteful.163 The American 
law of succession honors the testamentary intent of a decedent so 
long as that intent is not contrary to public policy.164 To the extent we 
view online accounts as property, we must view the information in 
such accounts as belonging to the estate and therefore distribute that 
information according to the intent of the testator.165 For example, an 
individual may leave an executor instructions concerning property 
containing secrets that he wants destroyed. In the digital asset world, 
a provision in a will would direct an executor to terminate and ensure 
deletion of all online accounts in the testator’s name. Such 
instructions would protect an individual’s privacy as well as take steps 
to avoid identity theft or fraud.166 In fact, this logic has led many 
estate planners to encourage their clients to include provisions 
concerning their digital assets.167 
Instructions from a decedent to her executor to destroy or delete 
her digital accounts may be the only sure way to protect personal 
 
 163. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 904–06 (Ill. 2009) (holding that a 
provision of a will considering grandchild to be deceased for marrying outside of the 
Jewish faith did not violate public policy); Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 228, 235 
(Mass. 1955) (holding that a beneficiary lost rights to a will based on the condition that no 
child marry into the Hebrew faith where the beneficiary converted to Judaism after 
marriage); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 872 (Or. 1954) (en 
banc) (allowing condition that beneficiary neither adopt nor marry someone of the 
Catholic faith by the age of thirty-two). 
 164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS §	10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 165. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 3–4 (2009) (“When people die, everything they think 
they own	.	.	.	everything will pass on to somebody or something else.”). As we will see, the 
law has been favorable to families’ commercial interests in a decedent through the right of 
publicity and copyright protections. See infra Section III.B. 
 166. See John Conner, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s 
Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 321 (2011) 
(discussing the threat of posthumous identity theft). A 2012 study revealed that thieves 
used the identities of 2.5 million deceased Americans to engage in fraudulent activities. 
Susan Johnston Taylor, 5 Prime Target Groups for Identity Thieves, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Jan. 13, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles
/2015/01/13/5-prime-target-groups-for-identity-thieves [http://perma.cc/NHS6-P57U]. 
 167. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass On, Don’t Leave the 
Passwords Behind: Planning for Digital Assets, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40, 41 (2012); Joseph M. 
Mentreck, Estate Planning in a Digital World, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 195, 198 (2009); Nicole 
Schneider, Social Media Wills—Protecting Digital Assets, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June 2013, at 
16, 16; Nancy Anderson, You Just Locked Out Your Executor and Made Your Estate 
Planning a Monumental Hassle, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/financialfinesse/2012/10/18/you-just-locked-out-your-executor-and-made-your-estate-
planning-a-monumental-hassle/ [http://perma.cc/RUA3-E9G9 (staff uploaded archive)]. 
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privacy after death.168 Executors are bound by fiduciary duties to 
carry out the intent of a testator.169 We trust that executors will carry 
out the wishes of a decedent, although we realize that sometimes an 
executor does not or may not implement the testator’s intention. An 
executor can be persuaded to take another action, or a court could 
decide that the testator’s intention as stated in her testamentary 
instrument violates public policy. For example, in Eyerman v. 
Mercantile Trust Co.,170 a testator directed her executor to destroy her 
home and sell the land on which it was located, transferring the 
proceeds of the sale to the residue of her estate.171 Neighboring 
property owners challenged the will as contrary to public policy.172 
The destruction of the house would have caused the destruction of 
property worth nearly $40,000 in a neighborhood of “high 
architectural significance.”173 The court frustrated the testator’s intent 
by refusing to enforce her will, holding that “[a] well-ordered society 
cannot tolerate waste and destruction of resources when such acts 
directly affect important interests of other members of that 
society.”174 In a similar case, another court noted that “[t]here is a 
greater need for the protection of the community interests after the 
death of the testator,” implying that the interests of the living took 
priority over the desires of the dead when those desires were arbitrary 
and capricious.175 If, however, a testator gives a rational reason for her 
desire to have her house destroyed after her death, courts have 
sometimes been more willing to uphold the will.176 
In the privacy realm, an executor would be bound by fiduciary 
duties to follow a decedent’s instructions to ensure that digital assets 
were deleted and not passed on to a decedent’s survivors.177 However, 
due to a practical enforcement problem, it is unclear whether a 
 
 168. The importance of deleting or terminating accounts has been recognized by 
Nevada, which has authorized by law the ability of a personal representative not to access 
but to delete certain digital accounts of a decedent. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	143.188 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.). 
 169. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators §	342 (2012 & Supp. 2015). 
 170. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
 171. Id. at 211. 
 172. Id. at 211–12. 
 173. Id. at 213. 
 174. Id. at 217. 
 175. In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977). 
 176. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Sur. Ct. 1998) (finding that a 
testator’s instructions to destroy her house were done in good faith and negotiated with 
the city); Nat’l City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1976) (finding instructions to destroy a house so it would not be used for commercial 
purposes were not repugnant or capricious). 
 177. See 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators §	342 (2012 & Supp. 2015). 
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testator’s stated desire for destruction would actually be carried out if 
an executor refused to abide by his fiduciary duties and the 
beneficiaries of an estate agreed with an executor’s action. Of course, 
if an executor failed to follow a decedent’s intent and the 
beneficiaries did not approve, the beneficiaries could bring a suit to 
compel the executor to implement the decedent’s wishes.178 If 
beneficiaries of an estate agree with the executor’s action, however, 
there is no plaintiff available to bring suit against the executor for 
failing to carry out a testator’s intention.179 Only those who have a 
“direct, immediate, and legally ascertained” interest in a decedent’s 
estate have standing to challenge a will or an executor’s actions.180 
There are several examples where famous individuals wished 
their papers to be destroyed at death, but their survivors defied those 
instructions despite being bound by fiduciary duties. Franz Kafka, for 
example, left instructions to his friend and lawyer, Max Brod, to burn 
everything Kafka left behind—letters, diaries, manuscripts, sketches, 
etc.181 Brod refused to burn Kafka’s unpublished work and instead 
prepared a posthumous publication of Kafka’s manuscripts.182 Kafka’s 
fame as a literary giant of the twentieth century was a result of Brod’s 
decision to retain and publish the manuscripts Kafka himself wanted 
burned.183 Kafka’s estate never sued Brod for violating the author’s 
last wishes.184 Similarly, Vladimir Nabokov requested that his last 
 
 178. See, e.g., Clark v. Greenhalge, 582 N.E.2d 949, 950, 951 (Mass. 1991) (holding that 
the executor must turn over a painting to the beneficiary, after beneficiary brought suit).  
 179. In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“A contestant to 
the validity of a will does not have standing to do so unless he can prove he would be 
entitled to participate in the decedent’s estate if the will before the court is ruled 
invalid.”). 
 180. York v. Nunley, 610 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a person 
who could challenge a will is “[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate and legally 
ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be 
impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the will” 
(quoting Bloor v. Platt, 84 N.E. 604, 605 (Ohio 1908))). 
 181. Arval A. Morris, Law, Language, and Ethics, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1342, 1344 
(1973) (reviewing WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, 
AND ETHICS (Foundation Press 1972)). 
 182. Elif Batuman, Kafka’s Last Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ACW5-
3KVD]. 
 183. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 15. 
 184. Two-thirds of Kafka’s actual letters and manuscripts ended up in Oxford’s 
Bodleian Library. Batuman, supra note 182. Brod retained the remaining letters and 
manuscripts and passed them on to Esther Hoffe, who in turn bequeathed them to her 
daughters. Id. The National Library of Israel challenged the legal validity of Hoffe’s will. 
Id. A Tel Aviv judge ruled in favor of the National Library in 2012, and the library said it 
would publish the documents. Alison Flood, Huge Franz Kafka Archive to Be Made 
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novel be destroyed if he died while writing it—which he did—but his 
son published the novel in 2009 despite his request.185 Ernest 
Hemingway also requested that his letters not be published, but his 
wife ultimately published 600 of them after his death.186 These actions 
were all presumptive breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the 
decedent, yet no one with standing challenged the preservation of 
these writings. Society may have benefited from the preservation of 
leading literary figures’ previously unpublished works, and the 
authors’ estates may have benefited from increased profit. The loss, 
however, is that the authors’ testamentary intent and privacy were 
ignored. If an individual with standing were to challenge an executor’s 
decision to not destroy manuscripts or letters according to the intent 
of a decedent, a court would likely uphold the executor’s action 
because such action would be in accordance with protecting 
testamentary intent. 
Of course, if a decedent is of such public stature that her 
personal materials would carry historical significance, the societal 
value of preservation and disclosure could override personal privacy. 
Some well-known public figures have recognized the danger that a 
court might so find, leading them to ensure that their personal 
materials were destroyed during their lives. For example, Justice 
Black destroyed the bulk of his Supreme Court conference notes as 
soon as he became ill.187 Similarly, Martha Washington realized the 
immense historical value of her letters to her husband, George 
Washington, and to prevent their being made public after her death, 
destroyed them before she died.188 
Thus, the law provides a mechanism for an individual to keep his 
information private after death by stating his intention in a legally 
executed will and relying on an executor to follow his wishes. 
Applying succession principles will ensure that courts honor 
decedents’ intent concerning their digital assets just as courts honor 
decedents’ intent concerning physical distribution of their assets. 
Where a formally executed will states a desire to destroy or delete 
 
Public, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/oct/15/franz-
kafka-archive-public [http://perma.cc/8M96-AKNW]. 
 185. Elizabeth Barber, Franz Kafka: Should We Have Never Known Him?, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (July 3, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/2013/0703/Franz-
Kafka-Should-we-have-never-known-him [http://perma.cc/2WBR-U4RW].  
 186. Id. 
 187. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 14. 
 188. See JAMES WALTER, MEMORIALS OF WASHINGTON AND OF MARY, HIS 
MOTHER, AND MARTHA, HIS WIFE 228–29 (1997); ROBERT P. WATSON, AFFAIRS OF 
STATE: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL LOVE, SEX, AND SCANDAL 82 (2012). 
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online accounts, that desire must be protected. As we have seen, “the 
organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is 
freedom of disposition,” and the law generally implements this 
principle by ensuring that “the donor’s intention is given effect to the 
maximum extent allowed by law.”189 A fundamental principle of 
succession law is that a court will implement a testator’s intent even if 
that intent is unreasonable or unfair.190 An individual may not have 
privacy interests under the common law, but an individual does have 
testamentary interests protected by fiduciary principles. Accordingly, 
executors should be compelled to follow an individual’s testamentary 
intent to delete digital assets at death and thereby protect digital 
privacy as a matter of testamentary law. 
B. Using Private Contracts 
Although the common law does not protect personal privacy 
from disclosure to a decedent’s next of kin, and testamentary intent 
regarding privacy has not been applied to digital assets, digital assets 
have another potential layer of protection because they are formed by 
private contracts. Contracts may allow or require an account to be 
deleted after a decedent’s death, thereby preserving personal privacy 
and prohibiting disclosure to an account holder’s estate.191 
The treatment of digital assets after death is largely decided by 
companies’ online terms of service agreements.192 The evolution of 
law in this area is in its nascent form. Because the common law 
affords virtually no protections to privacy after death for an 
individual, private contracts may be the best way to ensure that digital 
accounts are deleted after death rather than distributed to the 
decedent’s family. 
 
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS §	10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 190. See id. (“American law does not grant courts any general authority to question the 
wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or 
her property.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Contacting Twitter About a Deceased User or Media Concerning a 
Deceased Family Member, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/33-report-a-
violation/topics/148-policy-information/articles/87894-how-to-contact-twitter-about-a-
deceased-user [http://perma.cc/9SF6-TKH2] (noting that Twitter will delete the account of 
a deceased person, but will not give access to said account regardless of the requester’s 
relationship to the deceased); see also Dropbox Terms of Service, DROPBOX, https://www
.dropbox.com/terms [http://perma.cc/4QJ8-RVJC] (noting that inactive accounts are 
automatically deleted ninety days after the last login); YAHOO!, supra note 136 (noting 
that accounts may be deleted after an account holder’s death). 
 192. See, e.g., sources listed supra note 191. 
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There are three main concerns, however, with digital asset 
private contracts as they currently exist: (1) they do not allow an 
individual to choose the level of privacy that should be accorded;193 
(2) they do not ensure the deletion of an account (with all the private 
information an account holds) at death;194 and (3) they dramatically 
alter succession law by crafting a default rule without legislative 
input.195 Private contracts can be successful in protecting posthumous 
privacy if they work within the principles of succession law, 
implement testamentary intent, and include legislatively sanctioned 
default rules. 
Given the previously discussed failures of common law and 
testamentary structure to adequately protect posthumous privacy,196 
private contracts may be the only means of protecting privacy after 
death. We may assume that many people have some correspondence, 
pictures, or other personal information in their digital asset accounts 
that they would prefer to be destroyed after death instead of 
transferred to surviving relatives. It is also likely that some would 
want their digital assets to be passed on to their surviving relatives 
after they have died.197 Terms of service agreements, as a default, do 
not take individual intent into account in their blanket clauses that 
terminate digital accounts upon the account holder’s death. Yet, as a 
third party providing a service online, digital asset companies are well 
positioned to effectuate individual intent as manifested in the contract 
between user and company.198 The third-party service provider could 
simply include in the contract an opportunity for an individual to 
choose how she would want her account to be treated upon her death. 
Google, for example, has pioneered this kind of contractual 
agreement with its Inactive Account Manager, addressing the need of 
its users to have a voice in what happens to their accounts when they 
die.199 The third-party service provider would then be bound by 
contract either to delete private information after death or transmit 
the information to the estate. Furthermore, the third-party service 
 
 193. See infra notes 196–203 and accompanying text. 
 194. See infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 195. See infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra Part I. 
 197. One of the gaping holes in discussions about digital assets after death is the 
complete lack of reliable, empirical evidence about how the majority of Americans would 
like their digital assets to be treated postmortem. 
 198. For concerns about the additional cost this might impose on digital asset 
companies, see Banta, supra note 133, at 835–37.  
 199. About Inactive Account Manager, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts
/answer/3036546?hl=en [http://perma.cc/GM4T-6C6S]. 
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provider would have no commercial interest in exploiting the contents 
of an account,200 and thus might be more faithful and neutral in 
carrying out the wishes of the deceased than a beneficiary. 
Consider the situation that arises when companies refuse to 
allow a decedent’s estate access to his online account,201 or if no 
family member petitions the company for access to the account. Some 
companies’ default policy for managing a decedent’s account is to 
terminate an inactive account regardless of testamentary intent or the 
desires of an estate.202 These companies justify their refusal to allow 
an estate access by citing concerns about their users’ privacy.203 These 
blanket deletion policies protect a decedent’s privacy where the law 
does not. Thus, private contracts can give stronger privacy interests 
and rights than the common law or statutory law, but they ignore 
succession principles and testamentary intent. Whether such contracts 
can be enforced is another question taken up in the next Section. 
At first blush, companies’ concern with the privacy interests of 
their users seems reasonable and socially responsible. Legal concerns 
may also motivate them, as some industries have been compelled by 
federal law to establish privacy policies regarding personal 
information.204 But privacy measures by many companies have been 
 
 200. Any commercial interest in the contents of the account would descend to the 
decedent’s survivors. See infra Section III.B. 
 201. See infra notes 298–300. 
 202. See YAHOO!, supra note 136. 
 203. Options Available When a Yahoo Account Owner Passes Away, YAHOO!, 
http://help.yahoo.com/kb/index?locale=en_US&page=content&id=SLN9112 [http://perma
.cc/QU5X-U6NC] (stating that “[t]o protect the privacy of your loved one, it is our policy 
to honor the initial agreement that they made with us, even in the event of their passing,” 
meaning Yahoo! “cannot provide passwords or allow access to the deceased’s account, 
including content such as email. At the time of registration, all account holders agree to 
the Yahoo	Terms (TOS). Pursuant to the Terms, neither the Yahoo account nor any of the 
content therein are transferable, even when the account	owner is deceased”); see also 
Report a Deceased Person, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/408583372511972/ 
[https://perma.cc/46J9-KYCU] (“Please keep in mind that we cannot provide login 
information for someone else’s account, even after [his death]. It’s always against 
Facebook’s policies to log into another person’s account.”); Submit a Request Regarding a 
Deceased User’s Account, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/2842525
?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 [https://perma.cc/KA7A-3Q6U] (“Users have a strong and 
reasonable expectation of privacy and security when using Google’s products	.	.	.	even in 
the event of their death.” However, “in certain circumstances we may provide content 
from a deceased user’s account. In all of these cases, our primary responsibility is to keep 
our users’ information secure, safe, and private.	.	.	.	Any decision to satisfy a request about 
a deceased user will be made only after a careful review.”). 
 204. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 
§§	6501–6502 (2012) (instituting online child identity protection policies); Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§	6801–6809 (2012) (regarding the financial services 
industry); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §	222 (2012) (requiring privacy 
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largely voluntary.205 Companies often use their privacy policies as a 
marketing tool to show consumers that they are careful with the 
personal information stored on their websites.206 Sometimes, however, 
the privacy policies of a company are more for show than to protect 
substantive privacy—policies may disclose how personal data are 
collected, while also allowing the company to transfer those data 
freely.207 Policies that do so lack any real commitment to safeguarding 
personal privacy during life or after death. 
Companies also may take different positions on user privacy 
depending on what is at stake. For example, Google espouses a 
commitment to personal user privacy after death208 but in litigation 
has stated that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in emails.209 On the other hand, when a service provider states in a 
contract that it will not release the contents of an account due to 
privacy concerns, we assume that companies delete a decedent’s 
inactive account.210 As with all contracts, however, slight nuances in 
 
policies for telecommunications entities); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (regarding the privacy of individual health 
information). 
 205. Mary J. Hildebrand & Jacqueline Klosek, Recent Security Breaches Highlight the 
Important Role of Data Security in Privacy Compliance Programs, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J., May 2005, at 20, 20 (“[M]any entities, even those that are not under any legal 
obligation to do so, have been developing and posting Web site privacy policies.”); James 
P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the 
Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 1 (stating 
that in unregulated industries, “disclosing information practices is largely voluntary”). 
 206. Nehf, supra note 205, at 1 (“Market pressures encourage many businesses to at 
least appear sensitive to customers’ privacy concerns.”). 
 207. See, e.g., David Goldman, Your Phone Company Is Selling Your Personal Data, 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 1, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/technology
/verizon_att_sprint_tmobile_privacy/ [http://perma.cc/B8PS-9D4Q] (“Your phone company 
knows where you live, what websites you visit, what apps you download, what videos you 
like to watch, and even where you are. Now, some have begun selling that valuable 
information to the highest bidder.	.	.	.	Verizon is the first mobile provider to publicly confirm 
that it is actually selling information gleaned from its customers directly to businesses.”). 
 208. See GOOGLE, supra note 203. 
 209. Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual and 
Class Action Complaint: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 28, 
In Re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK (N.D. Cal. 2013). See generally 
Jessica Guynn, Google Must Face Suit over Scanning of Messages in Gmail, Judge Rules, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/26/business/la-fi-tn-google-
gmail-scanning-lawsuit-judge-ruling-20130926 [http://perma.cc/JFU5-KEV7] (describing a 
lawsuit filed over Google’s use of Gmail contents for advertising purposes). 
 210. Of course, it is possible that the companies do not actually delete the account and its 
contents, thereby assuring that the account information could be revealed at a future date. 
See Jacqui Shine, You Can Delete, but You Can’t Forget, ATLANTIC (July 3, 2014) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/you-can-delete-but-you-cant-forget
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language matter. Yahoo! has a policy that an account holder’s rights 
to an account terminate “upon your death” and “may 
be	.	.	.	permanently deleted.”211 Lacking in this language is a promise 
that the account will be deleted. When pushed by a probate court to 
release the contents of an account of a deceased user to the user’s 
father several months after the account holder was killed, Yahoo! still 
had the contents of the account and obliged without appealing.212 The 
account had not been deleted.213 The lack of assurance from service 
providers that an account will be deleted at the death of an account 
holder compromises the personal privacy that can be obtained by 
private contracts. 
Furthermore, even though a company has contracted with a 
deceased individual that the contents of his account will not be 
transferred at death, there may still be no way to enforce terms of the 
private contract after death. It is unclear whether a cause of action 
would lie against a company that released the information to an estate 
in violation of the terms of the contract.214 Surely, if an estate were 
petitioning for access to an account, they would not protest the 
breach of contract between a company and the deceased. Moreover, 
mere concerned citizens would lack standing to challenge the release 
of information by the company to a decedent’s family.215 
 
/373662/ [http://perma.cc/KBF9-PPEP] (explaining that once an email is deleted, it is still on 
a commercial server for a period of time). 
 211. See YAHOO!, supra note 136 (emphasis added). 
 212. Order to Produce Information, In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. 
Ct. Apr. 20, 2005) (ordering Yahoo! to give all contents of Justin Ellsworth’s account to the 
personal representative of his estate); Paul Sancya, Yahoo Will Give Family Slain Marine’s 
E-mail Account, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2005, 11:32 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday
.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-email_x.htm?POE=TECISVA [http://perma.cc/5R9E-
LV7M]. See generally Justin’s Family Fights Yahoo over Access to His E-Mail Account, 
http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/yahoofight.htm [http://perma.cc/L5V3-8PT6] (collecting 
news articles about the dispute between Yahoo! and the Ellsworth family). 
 213. See Jacqui Goddard, Bereaved Father Fights Yahoo for Dead Son’s War E-mails, 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2005), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica
/1480797/Bereaved-father-fights-Yahoo-for-dead-sons-war-e-mails.html [http://perma.cc
/V7FY-BSQ6] (noting that the decedent’s father was attempting to gain access to his 
deceased son’s email account prior to its deletion). 
 214. If the contractual right is seen as a personal right, it dies with the person. See 
Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553 (1867) (discussing the common law maxim “actio 
personalis moritur cum persona,” that a personal action dies with the person and property 
rights survive). 
 215. See York v. Nunley, 610 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a 
person who could challenge a will is “[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate and 
legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be 
impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the 
will	.	.	.	.” (quoting Bloor v. Platt, 84 N.E. 604, 605 (Ohio 1908))); In re Estate of Luongo, 
823 A.2d 942, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“A contestant to the validity of a will does not 
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Of course, a company may face market pressure if it fails to meet 
contractual obligations to keep information private after death. 
Perhaps users would be less likely to use a certain email account or 
social networking platform if they knew they could not trust the 
provider to keep it secure during their life and after their death.  
The Yahoo! probate case discussed above provides a strong 
example. When the father of the decedent sought access to his son’s 
account after his son had been killed in Iraq, public pressure mounted 
against Yahoo!.216 The father sued Yahoo! and a probate court 
ordered the company to give the father access to his son’s e-mail, 
despite terms in the service agreement that allowed termination of 
the account at death.217 To appease the public and the court, Yahoo! 
acquiesced, and did not appeal the decision based on the terms of the 
contract with the decedent.218 The terms of the agreement, however, 
were not individually negotiated or agreed to by the decedent.219 He 
had assented to the terms of the agreement through his use of Yahoo! 
as an email provider, but he had never expressed any testamentary 
intent regarding the treatment of his account after death.220 If Yahoo! 
had allowed some way for him to indicate that he desired Yahoo! to 
destroy his email account upon his death or provided some other 
document that expressly showed his desire that his account remain 
private, it is more likely that the court would have upheld the terms of 
the contract.221 
Federal law offers a set of unique potential enforcement 
mechanisms for contract law. If a company tries to renege on an 
agreement to terminate an account at the holder’s death and instead 
releases account contents to the public, that company may face 
liability under copyright or federal privacy law. Under copyright laws, 
a decedent’s family could obtain statutory damages if the release of 
documents, correspondence, or photos has infringed on an estate’s 
copyright.222 Moreover, the SCA,223 discussed earlier,224 prevents the 
 
have standing to do so unless he can prove he would be entitled to participate in the 
decedent’s estate if the will before the court is ruled invalid.”). 
 216. Order to Produce Information, supra note 212; Sancya, supra note 212. 
 217. Sancya, supra note 212. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See YAHOO!, supra note 136. 
 220. Id.; see also Banta, supra note 133, at 822–23 (discussing the failures of private 
contracts to address testamentary intent).  
 221. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing cases that upheld contractual terms in sperm 
donor and corpse treatment contracts that specifically demonstrated testamentary intent). 
 222. See infra Section III.B.2. Statutory damages are set out in 17 U.S.C. §	504 (2012). 
 223. 18 U.S.C. §§	2701–2712 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114, approved Dec. 28, 
2015). 
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disclosure of such information to the public without lawful consent.225 
Presumably, consent could be granted by a decedent’s survivor, but 
consent clearly could not be granted by the decedent herself. Thus, if 
a company released the contents of an account without the consent of 
either the decedent, in life, or the decedent’s estate, it could be 
prosecuted under the Act. 
Contractual protections may conflict with common law 
protections and an estate’s claims of ownership of publicity or 
copyright over the decedent’s unpublished digital assets. If digital 
accounts are not deleted or do not pass to a decedent’s estate, 
Internet companies could claim ownership of the information and 
release the contents of an account to the public. The public may be 
especially active in demanding a release if these accounts include 
information of public interest. For example, if the information relates 
to a celebrity scandal or a moment of national importance, the 
Internet company and the public may be more willing to allow the 
digital accounts to be released even in breach of contractual terms. To 
date, no Internet company has been prosecuted under the SCA for 
releasing the contents of a deceased account holder to family 
members,226 but perhaps there would be more concern about Internet 
companies publicly releasing information of deceased users.  
Even assuming that Internet privacy policies are intended to 
substantively protect the account holder’s privacy after death and will 
be upheld after the account holder’s death, a second conceptual 
problem with these policies arises—such policies are created 
unilaterally by companies with no input or direction from an account 
holder.227 In effect, companies impose privacy after death through 
contractual terms no matter what a decedent would have chosen.228 
This unilateral imposition of terms governing the posthumous 
disposition of digital assets contradicts the principles of succession 
law, which first attempt to implement a decedent’s testamentary 
intent and only then rely on state intestacy defaults to fill in gaps.229 If 
a decedent has not made his intent known, intestacy statutes control 
 
 224. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 225. §	2702(a), 2702(b)(3). 
 226. An exhaustive search of cases under 18 U.S.C. §	2707(c) revealed no such 
prosecution for releasing content to a family member. 
 227. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 191. 
 228. See, e.g., YAHOO!, supra note 136 (“Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, 
your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.”). 
 229. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§	2-101 to -103, -105 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008); see 
also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 64–65. 
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distribution of his property.230 Intestacy statutes are based on the 
individual decedent’s presumed intent.231 Private contracts controlling 
digital assets (unlike intestacy statutes) do not necessarily presume 
the intent of an account holder. Instead, these contracts dictate terms 
of an agreement that favor a company’s business goals and directives, 
not necessarily the best interests of society as a whole. Companies 
assume that contractual terms will be applied universally without 
regard to individual testamentary intent once an individual begins to 
use an online service. Because private contracts now control 
succession principles that have traditionally been regulated by state 
legislatures, private contracts have the power and ability to 
fundamentally shift succession norms and property interests in digital 
assets.232 
In sum, in the context of private contracts, individuals lack any 
ability to opt into or out of the default rules set by the companies, and 
the end users also lack an opportunity to choose how stringent they 
would like privacy protections to be for digital assets in the event of 
an untimely death. In sum, private contracts between user and 
company dictate all the terms of privacy after death and allow little to 
no input or comment from an account holder. This kind of private 
ordering is not the most reasoned and appropriate way to reform 
privacy rights after death. 
A default rule of deletion or preservation is the best way to 
ensure that people make a conscious choice about how their digital 
assets will be handled after death. In many ways, the debate about 
posthumous privacy comes down to one issue—if a decedent has not 
made known her intent about the privacy of her digital accounts, 
should the default rule be set by the terms of the contract or by a state 
legislature? Currently, in the majority of states, the default rule is set 
by contracts with a minimal required showing of the account holder’s 
assent to a company’s unilaterally established contractual terms.233 
 
 230. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 63–65. 
 231. Id. 
 232. For a fuller discussion of this trend, see generally Banta, supra note 133. 
 233. Only eight states have enacted legislation to allow an estate to receive or delete 
digital assets of a decedent notwithstanding the terms of service agreements. See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess. & June Spec. 
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §	5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 194, 2016); 
IDAHO CODE §	15-3-715(28) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary Sess.); 
IND. CODE ANN. §	29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §	143.188 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 58, §	269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS §	33-27-3 
(LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §	64.2-110 (2012 & Supp. 
2015). 
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The default rules depend on the policies of each company, which can 
be changed at any time. If we are to reshape posthumous privacy 
rights in a digital future, the conversation about how far those rights 
should extend needs to occur in a public forum, not in terms of 
service agreements posted online that most people do not read. It is 
troubling in a democratic society that private companies currently 
make the default rule rather than state legislatures. In a democratic 
society, default rules that affect our privacy interests should be 
established by elected state legislatures, not by corporations with 
disproportionate bargaining power. State legislatures should pass 
intestacy laws that enforce decedents’ presumed intent and allow for 
opting out of intestacy defaults. 
A few states have resisted online service providers’ unilateral 
control over digital asset succession and have enacted laws addressing 
the treatment of digital assets after death, but none of these laws 
explicitly address decedents’ privacy interests in their online 
accounts.234 Instead, these laws grant access to a decedent’s digital 
assets to his estate, placing the burden of protecting privacy on the 
estate.235 Digital asset succession laws in these states have not yet 
been challenged.236  
Private contracts have not taken the lead in effectuating 
individual choice for how accounts should be treated at death, and 
legislation is needed to protect consumers’ interest in devising or 
destroying their digital accounts. Outside the digital privacy frontier, 
a similar phenomenon has occurred in other industries where there is 
an unusual need for individualized protection for consumers. When 
legislatures find practices problematic, unjust, or fraudulent, they 
often enact mandatory rules that override private contracts. In 
landlord-tenant agreements, for example, courts and legislatures 
impose the warranty of habitability and forbid parties to contract for 
sub-standard housing.237 Similarly, courts and legislatures require a 
 
 234. See sources cited supra note 233. 
 235. As we have seen, an estate does not have an obligation to protect a deceased 
member’s privacy absent an express statement in a testamentary instrument, and, even 
then, an executor could violate her fiduciary duties to a decedent with the consent of the 
beneficiaries with little fear of being held accountable for a breach. See supra Section 
II.A.2.  
 236. No cases are reported that challenge any of the laws cited supra note 233. 
 237. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §	38-12-503 (LEXIS through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §	562A.15 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, §	4457(a) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Landis & Landis Const., LLC v. Nation, 
286 P.3d 979, 983 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a rodent infestation is an actionable 
breach of the warranty of habitability). 
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landlord to follow specific eviction procedures and prohibit the 
landlord from unilaterally setting the terms of eviction.238 Anti-
discrimination laws also limit the freedom of contract in landlord-
tenant relationships and aim to prevent a landlord from 
discriminating against potential tenants.239 In consumer law, rules of 
misrepresentation or deceit ensure that parties cannot supply faulty 
information to a consumer.240 Disclosure laws protect consumers from 
entering into unfair agreements.241 
Privacy protection after death is another area where legislation 
could accomplish a great deal. In the first place, legislatures should be 
responsible for creating the default rules of what should happen to 
digital accounts when an account holder dies. Through the democratic 
system, legislatures can engage in principled reform and create laws 
that both protect privacy concerns in information-heavy digital 
accounts and preserve individual testamentary intent. As a potential 
first step, legislatures could pass disclosure laws ensuring that users 
know how their accounts will be treated at death. Legislation could 
also mandate that companies give individuals a contractual choice 
about how their assets should be treated at death. Namely, individuals 
could choose either to have their accounts deleted at death or to 
release their accounts to their estates. If an individual chose to 
maintain her privacy by having her account deleted after death, her 
decision should override a family member’s desire to obtain access to 
the account. The third-party’s refusal to grant access would be based 
on the decedent’s clearly expressed intent to maintain her personal 
privacy in the account, even after death. Laws that require an 
affirmative choice for how assets will be treated at death would 
protect individual privacy and testamentary intent. 
 
 238. ARK. CODE ANN. §	18-17-902 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary 
Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §	83.21 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. & Spec. A Sess.); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4701 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess. & Spec. A Sess.); 
Hous. Auth. of the City of New Haven v. Martin, 898 A.2d 245, 248 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006); Corpus Christi Hous. Auth. v. Lara, 267 S.W.3d 222, 225–26 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 239. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §	4(6)–(8), (11) (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 164 of 2015 1st Ann. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §	10:5-12(g)–(h) (West, Westlaw 
through L.2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §	4112.02(H) (LEXIS through Legis. Passed by 
131st Gen. Assemb. and filed with Sec’y of St. through file 45 (SB 223) (excluding file 32 
(HB 56), file 34 (HB 124), file 38 (HB 237), file 39 (HB 259), file 40 (HB 340), and file 41 
(SB10))). 
 240. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §	6-1-105 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §	50-626 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§	13-301 (LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. §	47-18-104(b)(21) (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).  
 241. See ALA. CODE §	8-25-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg., First Spec. & Second 
Spec. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §	15-8-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.). 
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Private contracts, despite their noted shortcomings, should play a 
role in protecting privacy after death. The common law is ill suited to 
the task at hand because it does not recognize an interest in privacy 
after death. Private contracts and legislative action can fill a gap left 
by the common law by granting users more choice and control over 
privacy after death. Google, for example, has created a method for 
users to affirmatively determine who should have access to an 
account when it becomes “inactive.”242 Through Google’s Inactive 
Account Manager, a user may choose whether he prefers his account 
to remain private and be terminated at death or transferred to his 
survivors.243 Facebook has also recently allowed individual choice to 
dictate the fate of the personal information stored in an account.244 
Such avenues for expressing intent accommodate digital privacy 
interests after death and promote the fundamental principles of both 
contract and succession law. If digital asset contracts were to include a 
legislatively mandated choice between succession and destruction, 
such contracts would effectively balance the difficulties of protecting 
privacy and enforcing testamentary intent. 
Any legislation should also account for the fact that information 
may remain on companies’ servers for many years after an account 
holder’s death. Such digital archives may be a source of our history 
fifty or a hundred years from now. Posthumous privacy has a shelf 
life. At some point, no reasonable claim of privacy can be made. 
Recently, three-hundred-year-old letters were found unopened and 
undelivered in the Netherlands.245 These letters were written by 
members of all social classes and in a variety of languages.246 
Academics are eagerly examining them as they provide a unique 
glimpse into late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century Europe.247 
No reasonable claim of privacy can be made to prohibit the study of 
these letters because it has been too long after the deaths of those 
who wrote them. Legislatures should pass laws to create digital 
 
 242. GOOGLE, supra note 199. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See What Is a Legacy Contact?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help
/1568013990080948 [http://perma.cc/74MR-AK5U]. Facebook allows a decedent to choose 
an individual who can update a profile picture, respond to friend requests, and write a post 
on a profile once a decedent’s account becomes memorialized. Id. 
 245. These letters are over 300 years old, and no one is concerned about the private 
information contained therein because they are now a part of history. Maev Kennedy, 
Undelivered Letters Shed Light on 17th Century Society, GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2015, 10:36	AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/undelivered-letters-17th-century-dutch-
society?CMP=fb_gu [http://perma.cc/C9CC-R24W].  
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
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archives with information that remains sealed until the legislature 
deems that privacy protection is no longer needed. Because digital 
accounts will hold many historical treasures of our generation, it may 
be in the public interest to allow some sort of public dissemination. 
Such dissemination should only be permitted, however, after any 
privacy interest in those data has dissipated with the passage of time. 
By sealing these assets for a period of time after an individual’s death, 
the legislature can balance the need for dissemination and historical 
preservation with privacy protections. 
*	*	* 
As we have seen in this Section, posthumous privacy must be 
reshaped to adapt to the digital age. This can be achieved by allowing 
traditional succession principles to apply to digital assets. These 
principles ensure that an individual account holder’s testamentary 
decisions about her privacy will be honored after her death. 
Contractual terms can help support testamentary intent regarding 
posthumous privacy, but any contractual term that forbids transfer 
after death or presumes the intent of a user without legislative 
guidance should be invalid. It is the province of state legislatures to 
craft default rules regarding the assumptions of testamentary intent of 
digital asset accounts after death, and private contracts are not 
sufficiently equipped to fill that void. A decedent’s family can also 
protect privacy interests by following traditional succession principles, 
which will be discussed in the next Part. 
III.  DIGITAL ASSET INTESTACY: PRIVACY IN A FAMILY PARADIGM 
Surviving family members should control the disposition of a 
decedent’s digital information where the decedent has not made his 
desires known and no specific legislation exists. Although 
posthumous privacy is generally not protected under the common 
law, constitutional law, statutory provisions, or our testamentary 
structure,248 these systems and laws all point to the principle that 
surviving family members should have a claim in controlling 
posthumous privacy interests in a digital future. Legislation should be 
adopted that applies traditional succession principles to digital asset 
privacy, and in the absence of specific testamentary intent, a family 
should have access to a decedent’s digital accounts. 
 
 248. See supra Part I. 
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There are several justifications for this: first, inheritance has long 
been locked in a family paradigm. Property passes to an individual’s 
family if she has made no other arrangements.249 Privacy, too, should 
be protected or managed by the decedent’s living family members if 
she has made no other arrangements. Second, although the decedent 
herself may not have enforceable personal privacy interests, the 
common law affords limited protections to privacy after death based 
on concerns about familial privacy and human dignity.250 For instance, 
the common law is likely to protect distressing or disturbing images 
and information held in a digital asset account from public exposure 
based on a family’s interest in protecting that information.251 The law 
also protects privacy in the hands of a survivor’s family to the extent 
that information about a decedent can be seen as a commercialized 
property interest.252 These limited protections based on succession 
principles, family privacy, and commercial interests suggest that 
families should have a claim in controlling the privacy interests of a 
decedent’s digital assets if an individual has not elected to have her 
accounts terminated upon her death. A default rule should rely on a 
decedent’s heirs to protect a decedent’s account information from 
public disclosure, not from disclosure to a decedent’s family. 
Honoring a decedent’s testamentary wishes concerning privacy and 
allowing families to protect the privacy of digital assets after death if 
no intent is known will maintain testamentary devises in their family 
paradigm. 
A. Familial Privacy and Inheritance 
Allowing a family access to digital accounts and holding family 
members responsible for protecting the privacy interests of a 
decedent accords with practice and tradition. If a decedent has not 
 
 249. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§	2-101 to -103, -105 (2008). 
 250. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628, 
631 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting the familial privacy interest in audio recordings of astronauts 
immediately before the Challenger explosion); N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep’t, 
829 N.E.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. 2005) (“The desire to preserve the dignity of human existence 
even when life has passed is the sort of interest to which legal protection is given under the 
name of privacy.”); Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895) (“It is the right of 
privacy of the living which is sought to enforce here. That right may in some bases be itself 
violated by interfering with the character or memory of a deceased relative	.	.	.	.”); Reid v. 
Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (holding that surviving family members have a 
privacy interest in the autopsy records of a decedent). 
 251. See supra Section I.B. 
 252. See 17 U.S.C. §	201(d) (2012) (providing that copyright protection is transferrable 
through testamentary instrument or intestate succession); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE 
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §	1:3 (2015 ed.) (publicity).  
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made his intent known, intestacy laws divide a decedent’s estate and 
transfer it to the decedent’s surviving family members.253 Family 
members are usually those who must sort through the tangible 
possessions that may reveal an individual’s secrets. Families also have 
the privilege to protect information they discover or already knew 
from public dissemination. Expanding such protections and privileges 
from tangible possessions into the digital realm, states have begun to 
enact legislation protecting the ability of a family to access a 
decedent’s online accounts.254 While these statutes do not address 
personal privacy protections, they do treat digital assets as if they 
belong to a decedent’s survivors.255 Although tort law does not protect 
an individual’s privacy after death,256 it favors a family-centered 
paradigm to control private information about a decedent. Even if the 
digital accounts or the information contained within them are not 
seen as “property” or descendible to a decedent’s surviving family 
members, the information, images, or words in those accounts could 
receive protection under a limited common law exception that 
recognizes and protects family privacy. Although this exception has 
never been formally recognized or named, courts have protected 
family members’ privacy regarding information about or pictures of 
deceased family members. For purposes of this Article, I use the term 
“familial privacy exception” to describe the phenomenon of courts 
protecting family members’ privacy concerning the death of a 
relative. This Section argues that this line of court decisions both in 
traditional tort law and in interpreting public record dissemination 
exceptions could be applied to protect digital assets of the deceased 
from public dissemination.  
The familial privacy exception discourages others from revealing 
information about a decedent if such information would harm 
surviving family members.257 Tort law has protected a family’s interest 
 
 253. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§	2-101 to -103, -105 (2008). 
 254. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
& June Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §	5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 
194, 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. §	15-3-715(28) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First 
Extraordinary Sess.); IND. CODE §	29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. 
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §	269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §	33-27-3 (LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §	64.2-
110 (2012 & Supp. 2015).  
 255. See sources cited supra note 254. 
 256. See supra Part I. 
 257. See, e.g., Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“[Some 
courts] support the view that under certain circumstances the deceased's relatives may 
recover for the invasion of their own privacy interests even though they were not 
personally the focus of the publicity in question. The rationale behind these decisions is 
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in keeping disturbing or difficult images from the public based on a 
sense of familial privacy. To recover for a breach, family members 
must show that an image’s publication or disclosure is an invasion of 
their privacy interest, which will often require egregious facts and a 
high threshold of proof.258 Courts protect the invasion of privacy of a 
decedent’s death-scene images or last recorded moments not on the 
basis of protecting posthumous privacy, but on the theory that a 
decedent’s survivors have a right to privacy separate from the right of 
a decedent.259 Accordingly, if the living family members’ privacy 
rights were also infringed by dissemination of the decedent’s private 
information, those family members can recover.260 In fact, this tort has 
begun to expand beyond its common law roots; a relational right of 
privacy to the relatives of a deceased has been codified in a number of 
states.261 
If family members can only claim that they are relatives of the 
wronged victim and were “unwillingly brought into the limelight” 
because of the published information about a decedent, they will be 
unable to recover under an invasion of privacy claim.262 The tort 
demands a discrete harm to the family members’ privacy, such as 
additional grief caused by publication of emotionally taxing death-
scene photos.263 Mere supplemental notoriety is not enough. For 
example, in Flynn v. Higham,264 the court rejected the family’s claim 
 
that the relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in protecting their rights 
in the character and memory of the deceased as well as the right to recover for their own 
humiliation and wounded feelings caused by the publication.”); Bazemore v. Savannah 
Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga. 1930) (holding that parents of a deceased child could recover 
for invasion of privacy when a hospital published a picture of the malformed child as part 
of an advertisement). 
 258. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624 (“When there are unusual circumstances	.	.	.	it may be that 
a defendant's conduct towards a decedent will be found to be sufficiently egregious to give 
rise to an independent cause of action in favor of members of decedent's immediate 
family.”). 
 259. Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 197 (Ga. 1930) (“In this case the child was dead when the 
unauthorized acts were committed, and the right of action could not be in the child, but in 
the parents.”). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §	540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. A 
Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §	20-205 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §	839.1 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§	76-9-406 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §	18.2-216.1 
(2014 & Supp. 2015).  
 262. Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975). 
 263. See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 358 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010); Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 341–42 (Wash. 1998).  
 264. 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
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of invasion of privacy when a book claimed that their father had been 
a homosexual and a Nazi spy because family members were never 
mentioned in the challenged publication—they could only claim an 
invasion of their father’s privacy, which did not survive his death.265 
Courts use several policy justifications to support a familial 
exception in tort privacy law and to prevent dissemination of public 
records based on concerns about family privacy. These justifications 
include allowing a family to protect private information after death, 
protecting human dignity, protecting intensely personal moments, 
protecting a family from emotional pain, and protecting the 
decedent’s character and memory. These justifications also support 
allowing families to control private information in digital accounts 
after the account holder’s death in situations where the decedent has 
not made her intent known. 
In situations involving the disclosure of public records such as 
autopsy photographs, death scene images, photos of a corpse, or 
recordings of a decedent’s last words taped by emergency callers, 
courts often look to tort privacy principles in allowing the family to 
bring an invasion of privacy claim to control the dissemination of 
those materials.266 Courts have been especially sympathetic to the 
claims of family members to control the dissemination of photos of 
the dead or the last recorded moments of a person’s life.267 The 
Supreme Court recently held that FOIA recognized “surviving family 
members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close 
relative’s death-scene images.”268 
 
 265. Id. at 146–47. 
 266. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (death 
scene images); Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 358 (images of decapitated accident victim); 
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 849–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912) (images of dead, deformed 
infants); Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004 
WL 1770102, at *3 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2004) (taped emergency calls); Reid, 961 P.2d at 
335 (autopsy photographs). 
 267. Katz v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 482–83, 485–86 
(D.D.C. 1994) (protecting autopsy photographs of President Kennedy because they were 
not “agency records” subject to FOIA and stating that even if they were agency records, 
they would be exempt from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of privacy). Of course, 
death image pictures are not always protected. In Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1993), 
a newspaper published a picture of a woman lying in bed at a hospital and described that 
she was dying of cancer. Id. at 543. The court found that any privacy interests had died 
with the decedent and the family did not have a relational right of privacy in the picture. 
Id. Similarly, in Savala v. Freedom Communications, Inc., No. F048090, 2006 WL 1738169 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006), a newspaper published a picture of a man who had been shot in a 
public park, but when the family sued, the court did not recognize the family’s right of 
privacy in the victim’s death image. Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *1, *8. 
 268. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170. 
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Several other cases concerning death images arise from 
government officials using the images as a form of personal 
entertainment. In Reid v. Pierce County,269 for example, medical 
examiner’s office employees allegedly kept a scrapbook of autopsy 
photographs of corpses that they would show at cocktail parties.270 
The county argued that if any privacy interest was violated by this 
collection of photographs, it was the interest of the deceased and not 
the relatives of the deceased.271 The court rejected that argument, 
holding that the relatives of the deceased, but not the deceased 
themselves, had a protectable privacy interest in autopsy records.272 
More recently, in Catsouras v. Department of California Highway 
Patrol,273 highway patrol officers took pictures of a woman who was 
decapitated in a car accident and emailed these photographs to 
friends and family.274 These pictures quickly spread on the Internet.275 
The court found that the pictures were disseminated “out of sheer 
morbidity or gossip”276 and sustained the family members’ “common 
law privacy right in the death images of a decedent.”277 
In protecting emergency calls made by victims in a nightclub fire, 
a court characterized the calls as “intensely personal” and explained 
that they were “entitled to protection	.	.	.	to avoid a highly intrusive 
interference with the legitimate privacy entitlement these individuals 
should be afforded.”278 The victims’ families were not involved in 
these personal phone calls.279 Yet, the court extended the decedents’ 
privacy interest to the families because of the intimate nature of the 
calls.280 The court suggested that both the victims and their family 
members had a privacy interest in the calls, even though the victims 
died in the tragedy.281 
Similarly, in the case that determined whether NASA’s 
Challenger audiotapes would be released, the court found that the 
sound of the astronauts’ voices was an “intimate detail” that the 
 
 269. 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998). 
 270. Id. at 335. 
 271. Id. at 339, 341–42. 
 272. Id. at 342. 
 273. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 274. Id. at 358. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 366. 
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 278. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004 
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families had a right to protect, despite the fact that the families had 
no involvement in creating the audio recordings.282 The court 
explained that releasing the voice recordings would only add to the 
survivors’ anguish.283 A court also refused to grant journalists access 
to audiotapes of emergency calls made by victims in the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the basis that the surviving relatives had 
an interest in keeping the calls private.284 In these cases, the nature of 
the personal information compelled the courts to extend decedents’ 
privacy to their families to protect these intimately personal moments 
from public scrutiny. In effect, the court protected a decedent’s 
privacy interests through his family. 
Courts also justify familial privacy with concerns about 
protecting human dignity, thus blurring the distinction between a 
decedent’s privacy interest and her family’s privacy interest. By 
“preserv[ing] the dignity of human existence	.	.	.	when life has 
passed,”285 courts protect the privacy interest of decedents as much or 
more than families’ privacy interests in preserving the dignity of 
another. In this way, we honor the deceased by not disseminating the 
pictures of his death or the audio recordings of his final moments. A 
similar protection may be warranted for the last pictures posted or 
emails sent via a decedent’s online accounts, regardless of the 
underlying circumstances. 
Courts have justified familial privacy by pointing to familial 
rights in the “character and memory of the deceased”286 or in 
“honoring and mourning their dead.”287 In Schuyler v. Curtis,288 family 
members sued to enjoin an organization from building a statue of 
their deceased family member. The court ruled in favor of the family, 
holding that “[a] privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a 
deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for 
the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings, and to prevent a 
violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the 
 
 282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628, 631 
(D.D.C. 1991). Although the case arose in the context of the government asserting the 
family’s privacy interest instead of the family itself, the legal principles at play should 
remain constant even within the context of a family asserting the same interest for 
themselves. If anything, that the government here asserted the claim on behalf of the 
family indicates that the identified principles should apply more broadly. 
 283. Id. 
 284. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep’t., 829 N.E.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. 2005). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895). 
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deceased.”289 Thus, for a deceased family member to receive privacy 
protections, those bringing suit must be able to allege an intrusion of 
their own privacy.290 Curtis is not alone in relying on this 
justification—other courts similarly argue that this interest is to 
protect the feelings of the living, not to protect the feelings of the 
dead.291 In doing so, however, courts implicitly allow families to 
protect the privacy interests of the dead and control information 
about a decedent’s death that would cast a shadow over the character 
and memory of the deceased. 
Lastly, courts conflate a decedent’s privacy interests with those 
of family members by emphasizing the pain family members may feel 
when the decedent’s private moments are disclosed. Courts have been 
concerned with exposure that would cause families pain, humiliation, 
or distress.292 By protecting families from the pain of public 
disclosure, courts extend privacy interests beyond an individual’s 
death. Courts that protect familial privacy allow family members to 
control the pictures or words of the deceased in an unprecedented 
way under the common law. Courts have granted this control to 
families on a limited basis despite the countervailing concerns of 
freedom of the press and the free flow of information.293 
Looking at these cases in aggregate reveals that courts give 
several justifications for the right of familial privacy. These include 
preserving the human dignity of a decedent,294 protecting a decedent’s 
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“intensely personal” moments,295 protecting a family’s right in the 
character and memory of the deceased,296 and protecting the family 
from emotional pain.297 Each blurs the line between a decedent’s 
privacy interest and that of the family, and can be logically extended 
to apply to digital asset privacy after death. By taking into 
consideration the intimate details that often accompany an unsightly 
death, courts shield the privacy of a decedent’s death from public 
scrutiny. In doing so, a decedent’s right of privacy to intimate 
moments are still protected through her family members. 
Tort law demonstrates that courts are sympathetic to surviving 
family members’ desire to protect private information about 
decedents. Surely the intimate details, pictures, and voice recordings 
kept on third-party Internet sites should be entitled to a similar level 
of protection. Families would be responsible for ensuring that the 
material and information stored on the Internet, these “intensely 
personal moments,” were protected from public scrutiny through the 
rights of surviving family members. Because digital assets are more 
pervasive and capture the most detailed, intimate portrayals of our 
lives, the tort-created exception for posthumous privacy interests 
should extend to digital asset privacy as well. Currently, Internet 
companies control the fate of an account after death without input 
from the account user or his family. In most cases, however, it would 
better serve principles of succession law for surviving family members 
to control digital asset accounts. 
If an individual has not made her desires known concerning her 
digital accounts, a family member’s desire to know more about the 
decedent’s life should override a third-party contract’s terms of 
deletion. A family member’s desire to know why a decedent 
committed suicide,298 to understand more about the circumstances of 
a decedent’s suspicious death,299 or to obtain closure from the 
 
decedent. That protectable privacy interest is grounded in maintaining the dignity of the 
dead.”). 
 295. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004 
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unexpected death of a loved one300 are interests that should take 
precedence over the interests of a third-party company that stores this 
information. Public policy favors disclosure of factual circumstances 
regarding an individual’s death to family members. 
Social networking sites, personal webpages, and blogs are 
beginning to serve as virtual memorial sites to deceased individuals as 
family and friends mourn publicly on a digital forum.301 Family 
members usually wish to control the content of such platforms when 
they are used for the purpose of remembering a deceased loved 
one.302 For example, a man recently posted a picture of himself 
holding a gun to his mouth before taking his own life.303 Facebook 
refused to give the family access to the man’s account, but eventually 
removed the disturbing photo from his profile.304 If Facebook had 
refused to do so, it might have been subject to a privacy tort brought 
by his family alleging harms to the character of the deceased and the 
family’s memory of him.305 
In sum, the same justifications that promote familial control of 
death images and recordings may be used to protect digital asset 
privacy interests of a decedent from public disclosure. In addition, the 
common law tort exception for familial privacy interests demonstrates 
that the law favors giving family members control over information 
about the decedent. Both the common law exception and 
testamentary construction of a decedent’s privacy interests after 
death suggest that a decedent’s survivors are best suited to ensure the 
posthumous privacy of digital accounts. 
B. Commercialization of Privacy 
As we have seen, the law should protect a family’s testamentary 
right to a decedent’s digital accounts and favor familial privacy 
protections. The law also protects a family’s commercial interests in a 
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decedent’s image, likeness, voice, or original works through the right 
of publicity and copyright law. These doctrines do not necessarily 
protect a decedent’s personal property rights in her digital assets, but 
they do give the family another legal argument that the contents of 
those digital accounts should descend to a decedent’s estate. These 
doctrines can be used in an indirect way to allow a decedent’s family 
to protect posthumous privacy. In addition, publicity and copyright 
rights show that the law protects families’ interests in the intangibles 
of a decedent’s personhood, fame, or creation. Since the law protects 
commercial interests, there is ample room for protecting a family’s 
interest in the information stored on an individual’s online accounts if 
she has not made her wishes known concerning his digital asset 
personal privacy. 
1.  Publicity 
Privacy interests in digital assets can be protected through a 
family’s right of publicity. The right of publicity protects an 
individual’s right to exploit the commercial value of his name and 
likeness.306 This right developed as an offshoot of privacy law to 
prohibit the nonconsensual exploitation of people’s likenesses.307 
Mental suffering and anguish caused by the nonconsensual 
dissemination of an individual’s picture or likeness without consent—
the same harm recognized under the right to privacy—justified the 
recognition of the right of publicity.308 
Initially, courts used a privacy paradigm to consider exploitations 
of people’s likenesses. For example, in 1902, a woman brought a claim 
against a flour company that had circulated an advertisement using 
her picture without her consent or knowledge.309 She claimed that she 
had been “greatly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers” of people who 
had seen the advertisement and felt that her “good name ha[d] been 
attacked, causing her great distress and suffering.”310 The court 
viewed this claim as based on privacy, found that New York had not 
yet adopted the right of privacy, and, therefore, concluded that the 
plaintiff could not use a privacy-based right to remedy the wrong.311 A 
few years later, in Georgia, a court presented with similar facts came 
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out the opposite way. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co.,312 a man brought suit against a life insurance company that had 
used his picture without his consent.313 The court found that the 
complaint alleged an invasion of the right of privacy and should not 
have been dismissed by the trial court.314 
Eventually, courts recognized publicity as a separate interest 
from privacy because of the distinct harms that the two were designed 
to prevent: the right of publicity was designed to protect commercial 
interests, while the right of privacy was intended to prevent personal 
harms, such as embarrassment and emotional suffering. For example, 
in 1953, a court in New York explicitly recognized the right of 
publicity as separate from the right of privacy.315 The case involved a 
dispute between a baseball player and two chewing gum 
manufacturers that wanted to use his image to market their brands.316 
One manufacturer wanted the exclusive right to the baseball player’s 
photo, and the other manufacturer argued that “a man has no legal 
interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of 
privacy	.	.	.	a personal and non-assignable right[.]”317 The court 
rejected this argument and found that an individual “has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph,”318 reasoning that the value of 
marketing fame increased if it was an exclusive grant, barring others 
from using the images.319 
Once courts generally recognized the right of publicity during 
life, they next attempted to distinguish the right of privacy from the 
right of publicity, establishing the right of publicity as distinct and 
independent from the right of privacy.320 These courts argued that 
privacy protects a person from embarrassment as well as guarding her 
dignity and peace of mind, and also recompenses a person for 
emotional distress.321 The right of publicity, in contrast, protects one’s 
right to the commercial value of her identity due to fame and 
popularity.322 Therefore, when the right of publicity is infringed, 
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courts reason, the harm is commercial rather than personal.323 As one 
court described, the interest protected by the right of publicity “is 
closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing 
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and 
having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.”324 
By separating the right of publicity from the right of privacy, 
courts were able to take a fresh approach to the question of whether 
the right of publicity, unlike the right of privacy, is descendible. 
Courts and states are currently split on whether the right of publicity 
can be enforced after an individual’s death.325 The divide usually 
centers on how clearly a court has tried to distinguish the right of 
publicity from the right of privacy. Some have found that the right of 
publicity is not descendible because, like privacy, it is a personal 
interest that ends at the death of the individual.326 In finding that the 
right of publicity was not descendible, the Sixth Circuit explained, 
“[f]ame falls in the same category as reputation; it is an attribute from 
which others may benefit but may not own.”327 In a slight variation, 
other courts have required an individual to exercise the right of 
publicity during his life in order for his estate to be able to protect it 
after his death.328 However, the majority of courts and legislatures 
that have considered the issue have decided that the right of publicity 
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is descendible at death whether or not the individual exploited the 
commercial value of his name and likeness during life.329 
California, for example, protects the name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness of a deceased person for seventy years after 
death, during which time consent is needed for any lawful commercial 
use of the decedent’s image.330 Tennessee allows publicity rights to 
descend, but only extends the protections for ten years after the 
individual’s death.331 If, unlike Tennessee, a state legislature has not 
specifically limited the duration of the right of publicity, the right 
could extend for an unlimited duration. Oftentimes, however, the 
right of publicity does not stay in the family;332 instead, corporations 
purchase it.333 No matter who owns the publicity right, the right 
permits control over the use of a person’s identity after death and any 
profit from it.334 In fact, Forbes keeps a list each year of the top 
grossing dead celebrities.335 The likes of Michael Jackson, Elvis 
Presley, Charles Schulz, and Elizabeth Taylor top the list.336 
Of course, it is possible for a testator to request that her family 
not exploit her image after death, but the right of publicity would not 
further the testator’s objective. The right of publicity protects a 
family’s right to profit from exploitation, but not a decedent’s right to 
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prevent it.337 Strong publicity protections therefore give rise to a 
strange outcome: individuals can publish blatantly false information 
about a decedent without fear of reprisal, but as soon as that 
individual tries to put a decedent’s image to commercial use by 
printing it on a mug, advertisement, or pamphlet, the individual could 
be liable. Accordingly, publicity rights potentially emphasize the 
trivial while failing to offer substantive protections for a decedent’s 
reputational interests. 
No matter how they are couched, publicity rights are extensions 
of privacy interests in the commercial realm because they allow a 
decedent’s family to control his image. The interests protected by the 
right of publicity, admittedly, may not be information a decedent 
would want to keep private. Rather, publicity of image, likeness, or 
voice has a commercial value that is only realized through disclosure. 
Yet, the core of the right of publicity, not unlike the right of privacy, 
allows a family to choose which products and causes a decedent’s 
image will promote. If a company published a picture in a commercial 
venture that a decedent’s family did not want public, the right of 
publicity could prevent its publication. For example, in Gracey v. 
Maddin,338 a court found that a family had the publicity right in its 
deceased family member’s name and was able to prevent the 
deceased individual’s former law firm from using his name after his 
death.339 In fact, publicity rights have expanded to protect more than 
just a person’s name or likeness; in recent decades, they have been 
found to include things such as: a game show hostess’s physical 
pose,340 a professional football player’s nickname,341 frequently used 
phrases of a television show host,342 a Broadway singer’s unique 
singing style,343 and even the distinct details of a race car driver’s 
car.344 
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Thus, in those jurisdictions where publicity rights are protected 
after death, a decedent’s surviving family members could assert 
control over the use of a decedent’s image, phrases, or voice. This 
may be especially relevant to social networking accounts where 
Internet companies receive advertising revenue based on the number 
of people who view a particular site.345 If people were viewing the site 
to see pictures or information about a deceased individual, a family 
could assert its right of publicity and control how the third-party 
server used the decedent’s image, likeness, or phrases. Of course, 
asserting the right of publicity would not prevent the public from 
obtaining information on publicly accessed digital asset accounts and 
publishing that information. But because companies like Google, 
Yahoo!, Facebook, and Twitter gain commercial advantages when 
others visit their websites to view the likeness of a deceased 
individual, a family’s publicity rights arguably are threatened by this 
commercial use of a decedent’s online account. The right of publicity, 
therefore, is another legal doctrine that favors a decedent’s family in 
controlling her digital persona after death. 
2.  Copyright 
Digital assets are a unique form of property. Whatever property 
interest an individual may have in his online accounts under a private 
contract, an individual always owns a copyright interest in his written 
emails, photos, or other documents he authored.346 Although 
 
known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated 
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California.”). 
 344. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
 345. See generally LON SAFKO, THE SOCIAL MEDIA BIBLE: TACTICS, TOOLS & 
STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS (2010) (explaining how to make money by using 
social media); TRACY L. TUTEN, ADVERTISING 2.0: SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING IN A 
WEB 2.0 WORLD (2008) (discussing various methods of generating revenue through social 
media). Revenue also comes to the companies from selling the data obtained about a 
deceased individual. See Tamlin Magee, What Happens to Your Data After You’re Dead?, 
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tamlinmagee/2013/11/19/what-
happens-to-your-data-after-youre-dead/#2715e4857a0b78dba54e4f8d [http://perma.cc
/4RKW-WP69]. 
 346. 17 U.S.C. §	201(a) (2012) (providing that copyright protection subsists in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known or later 
developed from which such works can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated). “Works of authorship” include literary works, musical works, pictorial, 
and graphic works and sound recordings. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), 
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“Authors are continually finding new ways 
of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new 
expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of 
94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016) 
2016] DEATH AND DIGITAL PRIVACY 985 
copyright law does not aim to protect privacy,347 it could be used to 
afford a family limited protection over a decedent’s digital materials 
after death. 
Copyrights are based in the U.S. Constitution and governed by 
federal law.348 The Copyright Act defines copyrights as “an original 
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”349 
Works of authorship are protected under copyright law irrespective of 
whether they are published or unpublished.350 Copyrights are a form 
of property interest, and the copyright holder owns title to the 
material.351 In addition to this title, federal law allows the copyright 
holder the exclusive rights to reproduce copyrighted work, prepare 
derivative works, distribute copies, perform the work, and create 
digital audio transmissions of the work.352 The copyright holder may 
also prevent others from using or distorting the work.353 In addition, 
the owner of a copyright may transfer her title to the copyright by 
conveyance during life or through a testamentary instrument after 
death.354 
Copyright law does not take privacy principles into account in 
determining whether or not a violation of copyright law has 
occurred.355 Instead, copyright law aims to protect a commercial, 
proprietary interest in artistic material in order to encourage, not 
prohibit, public access.356 It does so by offering a “limited monopoly” 
over the material it protects.357 Especially relevant for our purposes, 
copyright does not extend to facts, so to the extent the decedent’s 
digital material is factual, copyright will not be an adequate tool of 
 
copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside 
the present congressional intent.”).  
 347. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he protection of privacy is 
not a function of copyright law.”). 
 348. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§	1011332 (2012).  
 349. 17 U.S.C. §	102(a). 
 350. §	104(a). 
 351. §	201(a). 
 352. §	106. 
 353. §	106(A). 
 354. §	201(d). 
 355. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he protection of privacy is 
not a function of copyright law.”). 
 356. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 56 (1961). 
 357. Bond, 317 F.3d at 393. 
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protection.358 The following case shows the extent of copyright law’s 
limitation in protecting privacy. 
In Bond v. Blum,359 a case arising out of a custody dispute over 
three children, a father wanted to introduce a manuscript written by 
his ex-wife’s new husband (Bond) to show that their shared home was 
inappropriate and, in fact, possibly dangerous.360 To prevent the 
introduction of this manuscript, Bond registered his manuscript at the 
copyright office and then commenced an action for copyright 
infringement.361 The court, however, held that the introduction of 
Bond’s manuscript into evidence was not a violation of his copyright 
and that the use of the manuscript “fell within the scope of fair use 
authorized by Section 107 of the Copyright Act.”362 In conducting this 
analysis, the court noted that the stepfather was not trying to protect 
any market use of the manuscript or claim any commercial damage.363 
On the contrary, the harm the father claimed was his lost right to 
control the dissemination of a private document.364 The court 
maintained, as have other courts, that if the “essence” of the claim is a 
desire for privacy, rather than commercial use, then the common law 
of privacy must be used to protect against the dissemination because 
the Copyright Act does not.365 
From Bond, we see that copyright cannot be used to protect the 
privacy of information in documents if there is no claim of 
commercial harm. The unauthorized dissemination of the manuscript 
in Bond needed to be challenged under the common law principles of 
privacy, not as a violation of copyright law. But as we have seen, 
common law privacy protections do not extend beyond an individual’s 
 
 358. Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 
492 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[C]opyright protection does not extend to ideas or facts even if such 
facts were discovered as the product of long and hard work.” (citation omitted)). 
 359. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 360. Id. at 390. The stepfather’s manuscript professed to be an autobiographical 
account of how he had murdered his father. Id. Although unpublished, the manuscript was 
discovered by the children’s father and maternal grandfather who were concerned about 
the children’s safety and had begun investigating their stepfather. Id. at 390–91. Through 
their investigation, the children’s father obtained the manuscript and attempted to use it in 
the custody proceedings. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 397. 
 363. Id. at 395. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id.; see also Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (M.D. Fla. 
2012) (“The only evidence in the record reflecting harm to Plaintiff relates to harm 
suffered by him personally and harm to his professional image due to the ‘private’ nature 
of the Video’s content. This evidence does not constitute irreparable harm in the context 
of copyright infringement.”). 
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death, and the family’s right to protect their own privacy after a 
decedent’s death is limited.366 Therefore, digital assets that may hold 
noncommercial but desired information about a decedent’s life would 
not be protected on either the grounds of privacy or of copyright 
unless the documents, emails, or photos had some kind of commercial 
value a decedent’s family wished to control by asserting the 
decedent’s copyright. 
Another hurdle in using copyright to protect the privacy of 
digital assets is a distinct variation of the fair use defense discussed in 
Bond.367 The fair use defense presumes that an unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material occurred but excuses the use nonetheless, as 
long as it is fairly used for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.368 For example, the fair 
use defense may be used to allow publication of facts about a 
decedent’s life gleaned from unpublished letters and personal 
documents.369 The fair use defense, however, is not ironclad and does 
not always justify copyright infringement.370 In one such case, a 
memory card with photos of a celebrity wedding was found in the 
celebrity couple’s car and released to a magazine.371 The couple had 
kept their wedding secret, but the publication of their wedding 
pictures informed their families and the public of their marriage.372 
The court held that even though the “clandestine wedding was 
newsworthy, newsworthiness, by itself, is insufficient to demonstrate 
fair use.”373 Thus, copyright law was used to provide a remedy for the 
wrong the couple suffered, and allowed the couple to prevent further 
 
 366. See supra Sections I.A, III.A; see also Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 
145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (collecting cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983) (collecting cases).  
 367. To determine whether a particular use of copyrighted material is “fair use,” courts 
apply four factors provided in §	107 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §	107 (2012); Bond, 
317 F.3d at 394. 
 368. §	107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work	.	.	.	for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching	.	.	.	,	scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
 369. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding 
that the alleged copyright infringer did not use the deceased’s unpublished letters to 
“recreate [her] creative expression, but to establish facts necessary to her biography”). 
 370. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that the fair use defense failed when private, yet newsworthy, photographs were 
sold to the media). 
 371. Id. at 1169. 
 372. Id. at 1168–69. 
 373. Id. at 1177. 
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publication of the private pictures.374 The privacy interests of the 
couple, however, were only tangentially at play. 
Because heirs continue to hold the copyright in the decedent’s 
works of authorship, they are able to protect the privacy of that 
information, especially when it comes to personal written documents. 
The copyright of the material does not extend to the actual object 
holding or embodying the copyrighted material; expression is the sole 
subject of copyright protection.375 For example, an author may own a 
copyright to a book, but that ownership does not extend to the 
physical book itself. The book is a separate object that may be sold or 
inherited, but the expressive contents—the actual writing in the 
book—may not be reproduced for commercial gain because of 
copyright protections. Thus, an estate has no need to claim ownership 
of the digital accounts themselves to establish a protectable copyright 
interest in their contents.376 
A recent example demonstrates how copyright can protect 
posthumous privacy many years after an individual’s death and may 
be applicable to digital accounts in the future. Jacqueline Kennedy 
Onassis willed her copyright interests in her writings, as well as the 
physical writings themselves, to her children.377 She also stated, “I 
request, but do not direct, my children to respect my wish for 
privacy.”378 Over a period of fifteen years during her adult life, 
Onassis wrote intimate letters to an ecclesiastical leader in Ireland. 
These letters reveal many personal and private reflections on her life, 
her marriage to John F. Kennedy, and her grieving process after her 
 
 374. Id. at 1183–84. 
 375. 17 U.S.C. §	202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied.”). 
 376. Some terms of service agreements require a user to “license” their intellectual 
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user’s copyright in the material. See, e.g., Facebook Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last updated Jan. 30, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/E8FJ-DJUV] (“[Y]ou grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-
licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in 
connection with Facebook (IP License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP 
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 377. Matt Viser, Kennedy Letters Fiercely Protected for Decades, BOS. GLOBE (June 10, 
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/06/09/with-kennedy-family-copyright-
claims-letters-from-jackie-kennedy-hold-uncertain-future/UqIpwZkgptcJvBov9e4JbI
/story.html [http://perma.cc/KCV7-L99T (dark archive)]. 
 378. Id. 
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husband’s death.379 These letters came into the possession of a college 
in Ireland, which decided to auction them off in a time of financial 
difficulty.380 An Irish auction house planned to sell the letters, which 
were expected to fetch at least $1.3 million.381 Caroline Kennedy (the 
last remaining child of Onassis) had her attorneys contact the auction 
house, resulting in the auction’s cancelation.382 Although the college 
owned the physical letters, Caroline Kennedy owned the copyright to 
their expressive content. The threat of legal action from the copyright 
owner protected the letters from being publicly sold and 
disseminated, at least until such time that the copyright expires.383 
Copyrights to works of authorship exist for only a limited period 
of time after the copyright owner’s death, but during this limited time 
surviving family members can use copyright to protect a decedent’s 
private correspondence from being commercially exploited or 
disseminated. Emails and social networking posts have the potential 
to be exploited after a decedent’s death, especially if a decedent was a 
celebrity or public figure. Because copyright interests descend to a 
decedent’s surviving family members, families are best suited to 
control whether information about their loved one is disseminated or 
protected when it is embodied in a decedent’s work of authorship. 
*	*	* 
If a decedent has not left an indication of how she wants private 
information stored in her digital accounts to be treated at death, 
family members should have the ability to control or access that 
information as a practical matter because they are responsible for 
ensuring that the decedent’s affairs are tied up after her death. Family 
members should also have a claim over digital assets to protect the 
intensely personal and intimate details of a family member’s life that 
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can be found in digital accounts. In addition, through copyright 
protections and publicity rights, family members can ensure that 
service providers do not profit from a deceased individual’s 
information, images, or works of authorship held on their servers. In 
accessing and closing a loved one’s digital accounts, family members 
will best be able to honor and mourn the dead. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have long held that the dead have no privacy interests to 
protect and that privacy interests therefore do not survive death. Yet, 
with the advent of digital assets and the immense amount of personal 
and private information collected and stored on third-party servers, it 
is incumbent upon state legislatures, courts, and the public to 
reconsider the efficacy of a posthumous right of privacy. This Article 
has argued that the current approach to digital asset privacy after 
death—namely allowing corporations to dictate the terms of 
posthumous privacy in private contracts—is inadequate because these 
contracts do not allow individual choice or testamentary intent to 
control the use of personal information after death. 
A multifaceted approach is therefore necessary. Private contracts 
are a laudable, if imperfect, tool for protecting personal privacy in a 
manner consistent with individual choice. To better align posthumous 
privacy interests with the needs of a digital future, the law must 
ensure that succession principles honoring testamentary intent apply 
to privacy as well as property rights. Following succession principles 
empowers individual account holders to make testamentary privacy 
decisions about their digital accounts and helps ensure that a 
decedent’s individual intent concerning the fate of digital asset 
accounts is honored. Finally, if a decedent has not made her intent for 
her digital assets known, the default rule should be crafted by state 
legislatures, not private companies, and should be in accordance with 
present law, which allows surviving family members to control 
information about and commercial interests of a deceased individual 
and to protect a decedent’s posthumous privacy interests. Legal 
privacy protections were born out of technological advancements, and 
as technology continues to advance, so too must privacy interests. 
